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 Foreword 
 
The Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF) has conducted 
the project ”Comparison of pharmaceutical prices in Europe” on behalf of the Norwegian 
Pharmacy Association (Apotekforeningen). The purpose of the project has been two-fold. 
First, the project should find a sound method of comparing prices of pharmaceuticals across 
countries. Second, the project should analyse whether the price level of prescription drugs in 
Norway is higher (or lower) than in comparable European countries. The project has been 
carried out by using data from IMS Health on prices and sales volumes of all prescription 
bound sales within the 300 most selling substances for first six months of 2010 in ten 
European countries. 
 
The current report is a follow-up of three previous projects. The first report (SNF report 
05/08) was conducted for the Ministry of Health, while the two following reports (SNF report 
06/09 and 08/10) were conducted for the Norwegian Pharmacy Association who is also 
funding this report. The continuation of this project has enabled us to further develop our 
analysis and understanding of pharmaceutical pricing across countries. This report differs 
from the previous reports along three dimensions. First, we describe the prices and sales 
volumes, as well as the computation of the price indices for the products under reference 
pricing (trinnpris) in Norway in much greater detail. Second, we have computed additional 
price indices where we restrict the comparisons to substances that face the same competitive 
environment (generic competition or not) in Norway and the reference countries. Third, we 
have constructed separate price indices for the brand-name and generic products. These 
additions to the previous analysis imply a sacrifice of the analysis of the development of 
prices and the price indices over time. 
 
The project has been undertaken by Professor Kurt R. Brekke (project leader) at the 
Norwegian School of Economics (Norges Handelshøyskole), Senior Researcher Tor Helge 
Holmås at the Uni Rokkan Centre (Uni Rokkansenteret), and Associate Professor Odd Rune 
Straume at the University of Minho in Portugal. The authors are affiliated to the Institute of 
Research of Economics and Business Administration (SNF) and the Centre for Health 
Economics in Bergen (HEB). 
 
We wish to express our gratitude to Director Oddbjørn Tysnes and Senior Advisor Jon 
Andersen at the Norwegian Pharmacy Association for useful suggestions and comments, 
although this does not in any way make them responsible for the report’s content and 
conclusions.  
 
 
Bergen, October 2011 
 
 
Kurt R. Brekke 
 
  
Summary 
 
 
In this report we compare prices of pharmaceuticals between Norway and the following nine 
Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom. The purpose is to analyse whether 
pharmaceuticals are more (or less) expensive in Norway than in the reference countries, and 
thus identify any potential cost savings related to importing foreign price levels. 
 
We use product-level sales data from IMS Health. The data contain information about 
monthly prices and sales volumes at wholesale and pharmacy level for all prescription bound 
sales of about 300 (top selling) substances in each country for the six first months of 2010. 
The data also contain information about manufacturer, substance name, product name, 
product type (brand-name or generic), pack size, strength, presentation form, etc. 
 
We compare prices at pack level and substance (dose) level. Comparing pack prices yields a 
high degree of precision in the comparisons, but results in non-representative samples of 
products, generating biased and potentially incorrect results. Thus, we emphasis the results 
based on comparisons of volume-weighted average (dose) substance prices. Using the 
Norwegian consumption of pharmaceuticals as the benchmark (weights), we compute a large 
set of price indices.  
 
Our results show that only UK has lower prices than Norway on the overall price indices 
comprising all prescription drugs sales within the top 300 substances. We get the same result 
when restricting the comparison to prices of pharmaceuticals that are patent protected and do 
not face generic competition. These results are likely to be explained by the strict price cap 
regulation in place in Norway. 
 
If we look at off-patent market segment, where brand-name products face competition from 
generic products, then UK and Sweden tend to have lower prices than Norway. Restricting the 
price comparisons to the products subject to reference price (trinnpris) regulation in Norway, 
the results vary according to how we construct the price indices. If we compare all substances 
under reference pricing, Norway has the lowest prices. However, if we restrict the comparison 
to substances with generic competition, then UK, Sweden and Denmark tend to have lower 
prices than Norway. Finally, we compute separate price indices for brand-names and generics, 
showing that Norway has the lowest brand-name prices, but has fairly high generic prices.  
 
Thus, the potential for cost-savings on pharmaceuticals in Norway is limited to the import of 
generic drug prices from countries like UK, Sweden and Denmark. The challenge is however 
how to extract the potential for cost-savings. This is would crucially depend on the chosen 
regulatory scheme and the market dynamics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Objective 
 
In this study we compare prices of pharmaceuticals in Norway and nine Western 
European countries, i.e., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom. These countries constitute the basket of 
countries that form the basis for setting maximum prices for prescription drugs in 
Norway, and can therefore be considered to be relatively comparable countries. The 
objective of the study is to see whether prescription drugs are less or more expensive 
in Norway than in other Western European countries. 
 
 
1.2. Data and analyses 
 
To compare prices across the ten European countries, we have obtained sales data 
from IMS Health for the 300 top-selling (prescription bound) active substances in 
Norway. The data contain monthly information about prices and sales volumes for all 
prescription bound products (within the 300 substances) in the ten European countries 
for the first half of 2010. The data set also contains detailed product-level information 
on substance name, manufacturer, product name, product type (original/generic), pack 
size, presentation form, strength, etc. We have prices per pack and per (standard) dose 
for each product sold.  Prices are at both wholesale (AIP) and retail (AUP) level. 
 
When comparing prices across countries, we construct price indices in which the 
various products are assigned weights to reflect a representative pattern of 
consumption in the benchmark country. In this study, we use Norwegian consumption 
weights, where products or active substances with high sales levels (measured in 
volume terms) in Norway are assigned a higher weight than products or active 
substances with low sales levels. In this way, it can be ascertained what the 
Norwegian consumption pattern (“shopping basket”) would cost in the various 
reference countries, which gives us a measure of potential cost savings. 
 
The calculation of price indices entails a trade-off between precision and 
representativity. For pharmaceuticals this appraisal is particularly important because 
many types of pharmaceuticals are involved (for various conditions), and the same 
pharmaceuticals come in many variants (original/generic, pack size, strength, 
presentation, etc.). Precision is maximised by comparing the prices of the same packs 
between countries. However, the problem is that a representative sample is rarely 
obtained. The most selling packs in Norway are not necessarily the most selling packs 
in the reference countries. Comparisons based on matching packs reduce the sample 
of products severely due to large differences across countries in pack sizes, strengths, 
doses, presentation forms, etc. Thus, price differences based on matching packs are 
likely to be biased due to sample selection problems and lack of representativity. 
 
Another approach is to base the price comparisons on (volume-weighted) average 
dose prices at substance level. For each pack we have information on the number of 
doses and the price per dose. Using this information, we compute the volume-
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weighted average dose price at substance level for each country. This approach uses 
all price information and constructs the “representative” price at substance level for 
each country. We then compare the average substance prices across countries and 
compute various price indices using Norwegian consumption weights. 
 
Many price indices are calculated in this report. First, we calculate bilateral price 
indices, in which we match products or substances that are common to Norway and a 
given reference country (say Sweden). We then calculate global price indices in which 
we only compare prices of products or substances available in all countries in the 
sample. The price indices are calculated for all active substances, but we also report 
several sub-indices for the on-patent market segment, the off-patent market segment, 
the market segment covered by reference pricing (trinnpris) regulation in Norway, as 
well as separate price indices for brand-name and generic products. 
 
Finally, we compare prices using a fixed-effect regression analysis approach. This 
approach allows us to measure cross-country price differences controlling for 
differences in pack size, proportion of tablet, generic competition, etc. The price 
differences are not weighted by the Norwegian consumption, but measures simply the 
average price difference across countries. 
 
 
1.3. Results 
 
The main result is that Norway is among the cheapest countries in Western Europe. If 
we look at the price indices computed for all products in our sample, only UK is 
cheaper than Norway. This result is consistent across price indices based on matching 
packs or average substance prices. In the other end of the scale we usually find 
Ireland, Germany and Belgium.  
 
If we look at the on-patent market segment, the picture is fairly similar. Price indices 
of products with no generic competition show that UK is cheaper than Norway, 
whereas the rest of the countries are more expensive. This result is perhaps not very 
surprising due to the strict price cap regulation that is in place in Norway.   
 
In the off-patent market segment, where brand-names face competition from generic 
products, UK and Sweden tend to have lower prices than Norway, whereas Denmark 
has about the same price level. There is some variation across price indices based on 
pack prices and on substance (dose) prices. 
 
Looking at the products subject to reference pricing (trinnpris) in Norway, the results 
vary depending on the sample of products that are used to compute the price indices. 
If we use all substances, we find that Norway is the cheapest country closely followed 
by UK and Finland. If we assume that products have generic competition in Norway 
and the reference country, we find that UK, Sweden and Denmark are cheaper than 
Norway. However, there is significant variation across countries with respect to which 
substances that face generic competition. Generic entry is affected by regulatory 
aspects (patent regulation, price controls, reimbursement policies, etc.) and market 
conditions (market size, income, population health, etc). Which price indices that 
offers the “right” picture depends on the question that is posed.  
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Restricting the price comparisons to generic products only, show less favourable 
results for Norway, which now has among the mid or highest prices. Sweden, UK, 
Denmark and Finland tend to have low prices on generic drugs. Thus, there seems to 
be some potential for cost-savings related to “importing” foreign prices of generic 
drugs to Norway. However, Norway has the lowest brand-name prices, which is the 
main reason for the overall low price level.  
  
Finally, we use regression analyses to study price differences across the ten European 
countries in our sample. These analyses confirm our findings from the price index 
analyses, though the differences in price levels are smaller. We also use regression 
analysis to study differences in percentage (not absolute) pharmacy margins. These 
analyses show that Norway has among the lowest (percentage) pharmacy margins. 
 
 
1.4. Structure of the report 
 
The report is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 we describe the pharmaceutical 
market and various regulatory regimes adopted in this market. We also classify the 10 
countries included in this study with reference to the various types of regulatory 
regimes. In Chapter 3 we provide an overview of the data and present some 
descriptive statistics of key variables. In Chapter 4 we describe how we calculate the 
price indices and report results from the price comparisons based on all products in 
our sample, as well as the products in the on-patent and off-patent market segment. In 
Chapter 5 we analyse the substances and products that are subject to reference pricing 
(trinnpris) in Norway, and compute separate price indices for this group of drugs 
depending on whether or not they have generic competition. In Chapter 6 we compute 
the price indices for the brand-name and generic drugs separately. In Chapter 7 we 
conduct regression analyses to test whether the differences in prices are statistically 
significant. We also test for differences in pharmacy margins across countries. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the report with a brief summary and some concluding 
remarks.  
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Chapter 2. Regulations in the prescription drug market 
 
The market for prescription drugs is generally characterised by low price elasticity of 
demand and considerable market power on the supply side.1 From a policy 
perspective, this is a worrying combination, since an unregulated market is expected 
to yield high prices and a correspondingly high level of expenditures for drug 
consumption. Indeed, most countries are using several regulatory instruments in order 
to control prices and total consumption of prescription drugs.2 In this chapter we will 
give a brief overview of some of the most important regulatory instruments used and 
briefly discuss how different regulatory choices are expected to affect prices and 
demand for pharmaceuticals. We will then categorise the ten different countries under 
study with respect to the regulatory instruments used. 
 
 
2.1. An overview and discussion of different regulatory instruments 
 
We can make a fundamental distinction between supply-side and demand-side 
regulation. Supply-side regulation attempts to control drug prices directly and can 
apply to different levels of the vertical supply chain: manufacturers, wholesalers and 
retailers (pharmacies). On the other hand, demand-side regulation attempts to control 
prices indirectly through the design of the reimbursement system. In other words, we 
can distinguish between regulation of the price that the suppliers of drugs receive 
(supply-side regulation) and regulation of the price that consumers actually pay 
(demand-side regulation). The latter type of regulation consists mainly of different 
forms of reference pricing, where regulators attempt to increase the degree of 
competition in the market through the design of the reimbursement system.  
 
Reference Pricing 
 
Reference pricing implies that drugs are classified into different reference groups 
based on therapeutic effect. For each reference group, the regulator chooses a 
reference price, which is the maximum reimbursable price for all drugs in the 
reference group. Any positive difference between the actual drug price and the 
reference price is not reimbursable. 
 
The effect of reference pricing is to increase the price elasticity of demand for prices 
above the reference price, which will stimulate price competition and yield lower 
prices. The lower the reference price is set, the stronger is the effect on price 
competition.3 
 
Generic reference pricing 
 
Under generic reference pricing (GRP) the reference groups are constructed so that 
each group only contains drugs with identical active chemical ingredients. This 
                                                 
1 See Scherer (2000) for an overview of specific features of the pharmaceutical market. Brekke (2009) 
offers also a similar overview with a focus on the Norwegian market. 
2 Danzon (1997) offers an overview of pharmaceutical price regulations with examples from various 
countries. 
3 See Brekke, Königbauer and Straume (2007) for a description of various forms of reference pricing 
and an analysis of the potential effects of these. 
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implies that GRP by definition only applies for the off-patent market. Thus, GRP is a 
regulatory instrument that is primarily intended to stimulate generic competition, with 
the expected price effects occurring in the off-patent market. 
 
Therapeutic reference pricing 
 
Under therapeutic reference pricing (TRP) the reference groups are constructed 
according to therapeutic (but not necessarily chemical) equivalence. This implies that 
drugs currently under patent protection can be included, provided the existence of 
sufficiently close therapeutic substitutes. Thus, TRP implies that (part of) the on-
patent market is more directly exposed to stronger competition. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that TRP also will stimulate generic competition, leading to 
lower prices, to an even stronger degree than GRP. 
 
 
Other instruments to stimulate competition 
 
In addition to specific reference pricing schemes, the demand side can also be 
regulated through the more general design of the reimbursement system. An important 
factor here is whether the patient co-payment is set as a fixed fee or as a percentage of 
the drug price (or a combination of both). By designing the reimbursement scheme 
such that the consumer pays a share of the actual drug price, the price elasticity of 
demand is increased. However, the pro-competitive effect of a percentage co-payment 
scheme is often counteracted by the fact that many countries (including Norway) 
impose a cap on total drug expenditures (per year and sometimes per script) for 
consumers.  
 
The absence of both reference pricing and percentage co-payment should in principle 
lead to a very low price elasticity of drug demand, with a correspondingly low degree 
of price competition. Among the countries under study, this situation applies to three 
countries: Austria, Ireland and UK. 
 
Another instrument for stimulating price competition is to allow for generic 
substitution by pharmacies. This means that, if a brand-name drug is prescribed, the 
pharmacy can, if possible, dispense a cheaper copy drug instead. This could 
potentially be a powerful regulatory instrument if generic substitution is either 
compulsory or stimulated through financial incentives for the dispensing pharmacies.  
 
 
Price cap regulation 
 
Reference pricing (GRP or TRP) does not solve the problem of cost control for the 
group of on-patent drugs where no close therapeutic substitutes exist. Therefore, 
reference pricing is usually combined with supply-side regulation. The most common 
way to regulate the supply side of the drug market is through price cap regulation, 
which defines a maximum price for each drug.  
 
Many countries have introduced a price cap regulation scheme commonly referred to 
as international reference pricing. This regulatory scheme implies that the price cap 
for a new drug is determined as a weighted average of prices for the same (or an 
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equivalent) drug in a pre-defined group of countries. This group usually consists of 
countries with comparable price and income levels.   
 
The most obvious effect of international reference pricing is that is contributes to an 
international harmonization of drug prices. The more countries that apply this 
instrument the stronger the effect. 
 
International reference pricing is now the most common type of price cap regulation 
for prescription drugs and is applied in a majority of the ten countries under study.4 
The exceptions are Denmark, Germany and UK.  
 
 
Mark-up regulation 
 
In addition to price-cap regulation at the level of manufacturers or wholesalers, most 
countries also regulate the mark-ups of pharmacies (and, in fewer cases, wholesalers) 
in order to control the drug prices that consumers face.  
 
One interesting issue with respect to mark-up regulation is that different mark-up 
schemes could affect the final consumer prices through the pharmacies’ dispensing 
incentives. More specifically, if pharmacy mark-ups are set as a percentage add-on to 
wholesale prices, pharmacies would have a financial incentive to increase their 
(absolute) mark-ups by dispensing more expensive drugs. This incentive could be 
eliminated by setting the mark-up as a flat fee. Even if the mark-up is set as a 
percentage, the incentive for pharmacies to dispense more expensive drugs could be 
counteracted by choosing a regressive mark-up scheme, where the percentage mark-
up is lower for more expensive drugs. As we will see below, all these alternatives are 
currently in use by one or more of the ten countries under study. 
 
 
2.2 A regulatory classification of the ten countries 
 
Here we classify the ten countries according to the different instruments used in 
demand-side regulation (Table 2.1) and supply-side regulation (Table 2.2). Notice that 
this distinction is not always clear-cut. For example, although we have categorized 
generic substitution as demand-side regulation, this could arguably also be classified 
as a supply-side instrument. The information is mainly extracted from the PPRI 
Project (”Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Information”).5 
 
When making this classification, it is important to bear in mind that many real-world 
regulatory schemes combine elements from the more stylized regulatory models 
presented above. This means that the assignment of different countries to different 
regulatory schemes is not always clear-cut. In Table 2.1, ambiguous classifications are 
marked with an asterisk and apply to Belgium, Ireland, Norway and Sweden.  
 
                                                 
4 In some cases, international reference pricing is combined with other criterias, such as therapeutic 
benefit, when setting the price cap.  
5 Available at http://ppri.oebig.at 
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Let us briefly comment on the ambiguous classifications. First, the reference pricing 
system used in Belgium can be described as an unusually far-reaching form of GRP. 
The reason is that the scheme was extended in 2007 to include, in principle, off-patent 
brand-name drugs without generic competitors in the market. Regarding Ireland, the 
generic substitution scheme is unusually weak, in the sense that generic substitution is 
merely allowed, but not encouraged through direct instructions or financial incentives. 
We have also classified Norway as a country with generic reference pricing, although 
this is not the official name given to the current scheme. However, the system 
nevertheless has the fundamental ingredients of a reference pricing system (with an 
exogenously determined reference price). The same argument applies to Sweden, 
which does not officially use generic reference pricing. However, since it is 
compulsory for pharmacies to perform generic substitution, unless the patient chooses 
to pay the price difference between the brand-name drug and the cheapest available 
generic drug, the system is a de facto generic reference pricing scheme. Finally, it is 
also worth mentioning that even if Germany uses percentage co-payments, this 
applies only to certain price intervals. 
 
Table 2.1 Demand-side regulation 
Country Generic         
reference 
pricing 
   Therapeutic       
reference 
pricing 
Generic 
substitution 
Percentage 
co-payment 
Austria No No No No 
Belgium   Yes* No No Yes 
Denmark Yes No Yes Yes 
Finland Yes No Yes Yes 
Germany No Yes Yes Yes 
Ireland No No Yes* No 
Netherlands No Yes Yes No 
Norway Yes* No Yes Yes 
Sweden Yes* No Yes Yes 
UK No No No No 
 
Regarding recently implemented reforms in these countries, it is worth noticing that 
Finland introduced generic reference pricing from 1 April 2009. It is reasonable to 
expect that this should lead to lower prices, particularly in the off-patent segment.  
 
As previously mentioned, Austria, Ireland and UK are the “outliers” in this group in 
the sense that hardly any regulatory instruments are used to stimulate generic 
competition. These countries do not have generic reference pricing, percentage co-
payments or regulatory schemes that provide incentives for generic substitution. On 
the other hand, Germany and the Netherlands are the only countries that apply 
therapeutic reference pricing, which stimulates competition not only in the off-patent 
market, but also among on-patent drugs. 
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Table 2.2 Supply side regulation 
Country International 
Reference 
pricing 
Mark-up regulation 
Wholesalers Pharmacies 
Austria Yes Regressive (%) Regressive (%) 
Belgium Yes Linear (%) Linear (%) 
Denmark No No direct regulation Linear (% + flat fee) 
Finland Yes No direct regulation Regressive (% + flat fee) 
Germany No Regressive (% + fixed fee) Linear (% + flat fee) 
Ireland Yes Linear (%) Linear (%) 
Netherlands Yes No direct regulation Fixed fee mark-up 
Norway Yes No direct regulation Linear (% + flat fee) 
Sweden No No direct regulation Regressive (% + flat fee) 
UK No No direct regulation No direct regulation 
 
 
Regarding the use of supply side regulation, we see that the combined choice of 
instruments varies quite a lot among the different countries under consideration. The 
most consistent pattern is that in all but one country, mark-up regulation at pharmacy 
level is applied (the only exception is UK, where pharmacy remuneration is based on 
fee-for-services). Several countries also use regressive mark-up schemes (or just a flat 
fee in the case of the Netherlands) in order to counteract pharmacy incentives to 
dispense more expensive drugs. 
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Chapter 3. Data and sample 
 
 
Data for the price comparisons have been provided by Intercontinental Medical 
Systems (IMS).6 We have obtained data for Norway and the following nine reference 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. These countries are included in Norway’s basket 
for setting maximum prices for prescription pharmaceuticals. In this part of the report 
we provide an overview of the data and the sample of active substances, with 
particular emphasis on how the prices are calculated. 
 
 
3.1. Sample  
The data contain monthly information about prices and volumes for all prescription 
bound products sold in the 300 top-selling7 (measured in terms of sale value) active 
substances in Norway over the period 1 January to 30 June 2010.8 The sample 
comprises exclusively pharmaceuticals sold via pharmacies. Pharmaceuticals 
purchased and sold in hospitals are not included. The data also contain detailed 
information on a number of other aspects such as active substance name, therapeutic 
classification, product name, producer, original or generics, patent status, pack 
formulation (capsule, tablet, strength, etc.), and pack size. 
 
Information on patent status was missing for 21 active substances. These are mainly 
older pharmaceuticals (vaccines and a few combination pharmaceuticals). Since we 
do not know whether these products are patent protected or not, we exclude these 
from our sample, which leaves us with 282 active substances for Norway.  
 
Table 3.1 Number of active substances in Norway and the reference countries, 2010 
 All 
substances 
Substances 
without patent 
status 
Substances on 
reference pricing 
(trinnpris) 
Substances in the 
sample 
Norway 303 21 52 282 
Sweden 293 18 51 275 
Denmark 290 18 52 272 
Finland 284 20 52 264 
UK 274 13 51 261 
Germany 283 20 49 263 
Netherlands 286 18 49 268 
Belgium 265 14 51 251 
Austria 280 19 52 261 
Ireland 275 15 51 260 
Global active 
substances 
210 - 47 210 
 
 
                                                 
6 IMS Health is a company that is specialised in collecting data on pharmaceutical sales throughout the 
world. They also provide market reviews and consulting services.  
7 Three substances on reference pricing (trinnpris) are not among the 300 top-selling drugs in Norway. 
The total number of active substances included in our sample are therefore 303. 
8 These were the 300 top-selling products over the period September 2009 to September 2010. The 
turnover figures are based on prescription pharmaceuticals sold via pharmacies. 
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Table 3.1 shows how many of the top-selling Norwegian active substances are sold in 
the other countries. As expected, not all of the 282 active substances on the 
Norwegian market are sold in the comparison countries. In Sweden very few of the 
substances (10 substances) are missing. The lowest number of matching substances 
we find in Belgium, where we find 265 substances of the 303 substances on the 
Norwegian market. Notably, the number of global substances, i.e., substances that are 
present in all of the ten countries, is 210, which is a fairly high number. 
 
If we limit the sample to active substances with patent status, the number of active 
substances varies from 282 in Norway to 251 in Belgium. The number of global 
substances remains unchanged. Finally, we see from table 3.1 that the number of 
substances that are subject to reference pricing (trinnpris) in Norway is 52. For this 
subsample of products, we find most of the substances present in our reference 
countries. 
 
Table 3.2 below shows the number of packs that are in our sample for the ten 
countries. We see that the number of packs sold on national markets vary a lot. 
Germany has by far the largest number of packs (4493), whereas Ireland has the 
lowest number (1419). Norway is in the lower end with 1730 packs. The same picture 
applies whether we look at the on-patent market segment (without generic 
competition) or the off-patent market segment (with generic competition).  
 
The table also reports the number of brand-name and generic packs on the market. In 
Norway we see that the total number of brand-name packs is 1130 whereas the 
number of generic packs is 600. In all countries there is an overweight of brand-name 
packs. However, if we limit the sample to substances with generic competition, then 
we see that the number of generic packs on the market exceeds the number of brand-
name packs, which is what we would expect. 
 
The large variation in the number of packs suggests that a price comparison based 
prices of identical packs raises a concern in terms of representativity. How many of 
the 1730 packs on the Norwegian market are also present in the reference countries? 
Since Norway has relatively few packs on the market, price comparisons based on 
identical packs would imply that we exclude a large number of packs in the reference 
countries. The also generates a concern of how representative the matching packs are 
for the price level in the reference countries. We will return to these issues in the next 
chapters. 
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Table 3.2: Number of packs, brand-names and generics, 2010.  
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
Number of packs , all substances 
Brand names 1130 1443 1152 1013 1261 1746 1235 896 1026 905 
Generics 600 1020 921 839 806 2747 1147 815 915 514 
Total 1730 2463 2073 1852 2067 4493 2382 1711 1941 1419 
Number of packs, substances with generic competition 
Brand names 461 652 473 463 711 802 607 386 448 386 
Generics 600 1020 921 839 806 2747 1147 815 915 514 
Total 1061 1672 1394 1303 1517 3549 1754 1201 1363 900 
Number of packs, substances without generic competition 
Brand names 669 791 679 549 550 944 628 510 578 519 
Number of packs, substances subject to reference pricing 
Brand names 233 230 170 197 280 231 186 137 153 160 
Generics 244 445 400 378 168 1015 405 425 393 198 
Total 477 675 570 575 448 1246 591 562 546 358 
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3.2. Price data  
In the pharmaceutical market, prices arise at three different levels: producer (ex-
manufacturer) level, wholesale level, and pharmacy (retail) level. We follow the 
established terminology and refer to producer prices as the wholesale purchase price 
(GIP), wholesale prices as the pharmacy purchase price (AIP) and pharmacy prices as 
the pharmacy sale price (AUP).9 In the study we primarily focus on AUP since this is 
the price that the public authorities (insurers) and patients face. However, we also 
compute price indices at wholesale level (AIP). The difference between AUP and AIP 
is the gross margin obtained by the pharmacies. We also take a closer look at this in 
the Chapter 7 in our report.  
 
Table 3.3. IMS price data: Observed price, source, calculation of AUP and AIP.  
Country Observed 
price 
Source Calculation of AUP and AIP 
Austria 
 
GIP Official list prices 
from producers 
 
AIP and AUP are calculated by applying regulated mark-
ups for wholesalers and pharmacies. 
Belgium AUP Association 
Pharmaceutique 
Belge 
6 % VAT is deducted from AUP. 
AIP is calculated by using reimbursement prices and 
regulated pharmacy mark-ups. 
 
Denmark AIP Wholesaler 
invoices 
 
AUP is calculated by applying regulated pharmacy mark-
ups. 
 
Finland AIP Finnish 
pharmaceutical 
association 
 
AUP is calculated by applying regulated pharmacy mark-
ups and specific charges. 
 
Germany 
 
GIP German Health 
Institute (Lauer-
taxe database) 
 
AIP and AUP are deducted by applying regulated mark-
ups. Repayments (claw back) to the sickness insurance 
funds are then deducted. 
Ireland AIP Official list prices 
from wholesalers 
AUP is calculated by applying regulated pharmacy mark-
ups and information on reimbursement prices. 
 
The Netherlands AIP Pharmacy invoices AUP is calculated by deducting estimated AIP discounts 
and then applying regulated pharmacy mark-ups. 
 
Norway AIP for all 
substances 
and AUP for 
trinnpris 
Wholesale invoices 
and Farmapro for 
trinnpris products.  
AUP is calculated using regulated mark-ups for all 
substances, except for substances under trinnpris where 
data are from the Norwegian Pharmacy Association 
database (Farmapro). 
 
Sweden 
 
AIP Apoteket AUP is calculated by applying regulated pharmacy mark-
ups. 
 
United 
Kingdom 
AIP National Health 
Service 
AUP is calculated by deducting estimated AIP discounts 
and then applying regulated pharmacy mark-ups 
(dispensing fees). 
 
 
                                                 
9 The abbriviations refer to the Norwegian terminology for the different price levels, where GIP stands 
for “Grossistenes innkjøpspris”, AIP stands for “Apotekenes innkjøpspris” and AUP stands for 
“Apotekenes utsalgspris”. 
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IMS collects price data in different ways in the individual countries. In principle, it 
collects information on actual pricing at a point in the distribution chain. It then uses 
detailed information from each country on discounts, profit regulations and 
reimbursement prices to calculate the other prices. It also calculates wholesale and 
pharmacy margins where necessary. Table 3.3 above provides an overview of how the 
price data from IMS have arisen for each country. 
 
In this report the prices for products subject to reference pricing (trinnpris) in Norway 
has been obtained from the Norwegian Pharmacy Associations database Farmapro. 
The reason for this was that the Norwegian Ministry of Health was concerned whether 
the IMS had computed the prices for this group of drugs properly. IMS observes the 
transacted wholesale price (AIP) of products in Norway from invoices, but estimates 
the pharmacy price (AUP) by applying an estimated pharmacy margin on each 
product. To ensure the validity of the pharmacy prices of the trinnpris products in 
Norway, the Norwegian Pharmacy Association delivered the transacted prices at 
pharmacy level to IMS. After comparing the prices, IMS concluded that the prices 
were systematically biased in the sense that their estimated pharmacy margins of 
especially the generic drugs were too low. For the current report IMS has therefore 
supplied us with the transacted pharmacy prices (AUP) for all the products subject to 
trinnpris regulation in Norway. 
 
The prices in our data are free of value added tax (VAT). Price differences therefore 
do not reflect differences in VAT between countries. Most countries in the sample 
have lower value added tax than Norway, apart from Denmark, which also has a VAT 
rate of 25%. Sweden, for example, has no VAT on prescription drugs, followed by 
Belgium and the Netherlands with only 6% VAT. From economic theory, we know 
that high taxes can contribute to producers cutting their prices to avoid losing sales. 
However, as long as demand for pharmaceuticals is relatively price inelastic, it is 
likely that payers and potentially patients bear much of the burden associated with 
high levels of VAT.10 
 
The prices are in the individual country’s currency. We have converted all prices to 
the Norwegian currency, so all prices are expressed in Norske kroner (NOK). For 
each month, we use the average exchange rate for the previous six months: For 
January 2010, we thus use the average exchange rate for the period from August up to 
and including December 2009; for February 2010, we use the average exchange rate 
for the period from September 2009 up to and including January 2010, etc.11 
 
The price data come in two variants: price per pack and price per dose. The price per 
pack will be used when we compare identical packs across countries. The advantage 
of this approach is that precision is ensured in the sense that exactly the same product 
is compared across countries. However, the disadvantages are many, and essentially 
relate to a lack of representativity. Firstly, picking only the best-selling pack for each 
substance implies that we throw away information about all other packs for this 
substance. For Norway this means that we reduce our sample from 1687 to 282 packs.   
                                                 
10 In Norway the payer (insurer) is the government, which is also the tax collecter, so the effect of the 
high VAT on the pharmaceutical expenditures net of the tax income is not necessarily negative.  
11 This is the same procedure that Legemiddelverket, which is the regulatory body for the 
pharmaceutical sector, uses when computing the maximum prices (price caps) for prescription drugs on 
the Norwegian market. 
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Secondly, the top-selling pack in Norway may not be among the top-selling ones in 
the reference countries. In the worst case, this pack is not sold at all in these countries. 
Thus, the number of matching packs will be much lower than 282 packs, reducing the 
representativity of the sample not just in Norway, but even more in the reference 
country, so that the resulting price differences would be biased and likely incorrect. 
Finally, selecting the top selling pack in Norway as a measure of comparing prices 
will imply that generics often drop out. For substances that have come off patent, 
there are often a number of generic products on the market, which at least individually 
have a smaller market share than the original product. A selection based on top-selling 
packs within an active substance could then lead to low representativity of generic 
products in the segment for non-patent-protected products, and not give a true picture 
of the price because the original preparation is typically higher priced than generics. 
 
As shown in Table 3.4 below, the average pack size varies significantly across 
countries. Austria has the smallest packages, with an average of 29.0 doses per pack. 
Sweden, on the other hand, has the largest packages, with an average of 58.8 doses 
per pack, which is more than double the size of Austria. The pack size in Norway is 
fairly average of the countries in the sample. This variation in pack size suggests that 
basing price comparisons on matching of identical packs is likely to generate incorrect 
measures of price differences across countries. 
 
Table 3.4 Average number of doses per pack. 
 All active substances Substances with patent 
status 
Austria 29,0 30,3 
Ireland 41,0 44,8 
UK 38,5 45,7 
Belgium 52,4 59,5 
Norway 38,5 46,5 
Germany 48,1 55,7 
Finland 44,4 47,4 
Denmark 52,5 73,3 
Netherlands 49,1 62,2 
Sweden 58,8 75,9 
 
In the current report we improve the price comparison based on matching of identical 
packs. Instead of selecting the top-selling pack for each substance, we use the whole 
sample of packs on the market in Norway. For each reference country, we then match 
the identical packs that are common for Norway and the reference country. This 
enables us to generate a much larger and thus more representative sample of products 
that we can base the price comparisons on.  
 
However, the approach that maximises representativity is to use (volume-weighted) 
average substance (dose) prices. Price per dose is indicated by price per IMS standard 
unit12. A standard unit is a proxy for a dose, and is defined by IMS as a tablet, a 
capsule, 10 ml liquid, etc. It is difficult to find a perfect measure of a dose, but as long 
as a dose is relatively constant across the countries in the sample, this will be 
                                                 
12 There are other dose measures used such as price per defined daily dose (DDD), price per gram of 
active substance, etc. These are not available to us via IMS’s data set. 
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relatively unproblematic. The advantage of price per dose is that these are defined for 
all packs and formulations. This makes it possible to calculate an average price for 
each active substance. Such an approach means that we make use of all price 
information in our data. This also ensures a good representation of generics. As we 
will explain later, we weight the prices for an active substance by volume, so that we 
attach greater importance to the price of products that sell more than to the price of 
products that sell less. The weightings are calculated on the basis of each country’s 
sales, so that we obtain the most representative price for each country. In this way, we 
achieve a high level of representativity. 
 
Using volume-weighted average substance prices is in line with Danzon and Chao 
(2000), who also provide a discussion of why this approach is better than basing price 
comparisons on identical packs. See also Danzon (1999) for a broad review of studies 
on cross-national price comparisons for pharmaceuticals.  
 
 
3.3. Volume data 
 
The data set contains two types of volume data: number of packs and number of 
doses, where the number of doses is represented by IMS standard units as described 
above. The volume data are per product (article number) and per month for each of 
the countries we include in the sample for the whole period.  
 
Volume data are used primarily to weight prices. The number of packs sold is not 
especially suitable for calculating weights as packs, both within active substances and 
not least across active substances, have differing numbers of doses (tablets, capsules, 
etc.). Active substances that typically have many doses in a pack will then be given 
too low a weight, and vice versa. We therefore use the number of doses as a basis for 
calculating weights.  
 
We have two types of volume weights: (i) Weights across active substance and packs 
and (ii) weights within active substances. The weights within an active substance are 
used to calculated average prices, as will be described in section 3.4. The weights 
across active substances and packs are used to calculate indices, where they will 
reflect consumption patterns so that prices of active substances with high sales (high 
number of doses) are assigned a higher weighting than prices of active substances 
with low sales. As Norway is the starting point for the study, the price indices will be 
calculated with Norwegian consumption weights. This is presented in more detail 
when we calculate prices and indices in the next two chapters. 
 
 
3.4. Volume-weighted average substance prices  
For each active substance, we have a number of different pack types and we also have 
data for six months. This means that, for each active substance, we have a number of 
price observations (per dose) where some active substances have relatively few 
observations and others have relatively many. Furthermore, it is the case that some 
pack types have relatively high sales, while others are sold to a lesser extent. The aim 
of the volume-weighted average prices is precisely to take account of this, i.e. we 
want to weight the prices per dose of the top-selling pack types more than the lower-
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selling packs. To take care of this, we have, for each active substance and for each 
country, weighted the price per dose with the proportion of sales this pack accounts 
for out of total turnover for the active substance in this country. We then sum the 
volume-weighted prices within each active substance, and thereby get a price per dose 
per active substance. A simple example may make things clear: Assume that for 
active substance A (for example in Norway) we have three different packs with the 
following prices and turnover:  
 
 Pack 1A: the price is NOK 10 per dose and turnover is 5 doses  
 Pack 2A: the price is NOK 20 per dose and turnover is 10 doses  
 Pack 3A: the price is NOK 30 per dose and turnover is 15 doses  
 
The volume-weighted average price per dose then becomes: 
 
 33.23
30
1530
30
1020
30
510 NOKNOKNOKNOK    
 
The arithmetic (unweighted) mean in the example above is NOK 20. The volume-
weighted average price in the example then becomes higher because the most 
expensive packs are the top-selling ones. If this has been the opposite – i.e. if turnover 
of the more expensive packs had been relatively low – the volume-weighted average 
price would conversely have been lower than the arithmetic mean. 
 
Many studies compare prices of identical packs instead of calculating the average 
price within an active substance. The top-selling pack in the base country is then 
selected, and the price of this pack is then compared with corresponding packs in the 
reference countries. In our example, pack 3A is the top-selling one with a price of 
NOK 30. The problem with this approach is, as mentioned earlier, that this pack may 
not exist or may have lower sales in the reference countries. In addition, we throw 
away a lot of information by excluding other pack sizes in the price comparison. 
Volume-weighted average prices take account of both these aspects, and yield a much 
higher level of representativity. 
 
 
3.5. Percentage margins 
 
As we have information on pharmacies’ sale price (AUP) and pharmacies’ purchase price 
(AIP), it is possible to say something about how the margins vary between countries. To 
calculate the margins, we use the most common method (the Lerner index) for calculating 
relative margins/price supplements in a market:  
 
100
i
ii
AUP
AIPAUPM   
 
The margin is thus measured as a percentage of the pharmacies’ sale price (AUP). For 
each country, we use volume-weighted average AUP and AIP per active substance 
and calculate margins on the basis of these prices as described above. 
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3.6. The patent and generic market segment  
 
The sample contains pharmaceuticals that are on patent and pharmaceuticals whose 
patents have expired and copy preparations (generics) have been launched, or could 
potentially be launched, as an alternative to the original preparation. It may be useful 
to break down the sample according to whether or not the pharmaceutical is protected, 
partly because the competitive situation is different and partly because many 
countries, including Norway, use different regulations of these two segments. In 
addition, it is the case that a certain yield (and thus a higher price) will be ensured 
during the patent period to promote innovation in pharmaceuticals, while the lowest 
possible price is a natural policy target once the patent has expired. One way of 
dividing the sample could be to use the patent status information in the data set. It 
emerges, however, that pharmaceuticals within the same active substance are 
registered both as being on patent (protected) and off patent (not protected). In 
addition, this variable is difficult to use across countries. However, the data set 
contains information on whether a pharmaceutical is an original preparation or 
generic.13 We therefore observe whether generics are sold within an active substance. 
This information can be used to generate several subsamples depending on the 
question that one wants to address. We describe in the next chapters how we construct 
subsamples using the information of whether a substance has generic competition or 
not.  
                                                 
13 This information does not exist for certain pharmaceuticals. This group is equivalent to those that do 
not have patent status, as discussed in the introduction. These (21) active substances are excluded from 
the data set, so that we are left with (282) active substances with information on whether an original 
preparation or generic is involved. 
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Chapter 4. Price indices: overall, on-patent and off-patent 
 
 
In this chapter we present the results for the various price indices we have calculated 
for Norway and the nine reference countries. Price indices are often sensitive to how 
these are calculated. We have therefore conducted a number of different 
approximations for calculating the indices. First, we compare prices of identical packs 
between countries. Second, we compute volume-weighted average prices per dose per 
substance and use these to compare prices and construct price indices. Third, we 
calculate bilateral and global price indices at wholesale (AIP) and retail (AUP) level. 
Finally, we calculate separate indices for the on-patent and off-patent market 
segments. Before we present the analyses, we provide a brief theoretical presentation 
of price indices generally. 
 
 
4.1. General aspects of price indices 
 
A price index is a weighted average of prices for different products, generally 
calculated over time, such as the consumer price index. If we have two time periods, 
period 0 and t, and two products, product 1 and 2, we can express a price index as 
follows: 
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where w1 and w2 are weights applied to the respective prices and tt pppp 2
0
21
0
1  and ,, . In 
calculating price indices, it is customary to use sold quantities as weights to take 
account of the relative importance of the various product prices. We can obtain two 
different indices depending on the choice of weights. If we choose sold quantities in 
the last period (period t) as weights, we obtain the so-called Paasche price index: 
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where tt qq 21  and  are quantities of product 1 and 2 sold in period t. If we choose 
quantities sold over the base period (period 0) as weightings, we obtain the so-called 
Laspeyres price index: 
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where 01q  and 
0
2q  are quantities of product 1 and 2 sold in period 0. Both these price 
indices will express changes in average prices over time. If prices are less (more) than 
100, this means that there has been a reduction (increase) in average prices over the 
period. 
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In this study, we calculate differences in average prices across countries (not over 
time) to see whether the prices of pharmaceuticals in Norway are higher or lower than 
in other countries. Let us assume two countries, Norway and Abroad, where products 
1 and 2 are sold (but with potentially different quantities). The general price index can 
then be expressed as 
 
,100
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where Up1  and 
Up2  are the prices of product 1 and 2 abroad, and 
Np1  are 
Np2  the 
prices of products 1 and 2 in Norway, and w1 and w2 are the weights to be applied to 
these different prices. It is customary to use weights to express the relative importance 
of the products including when price indices are to be calculated across countries. If 
we use quantities sold abroad as weights, we calculate a Paasche price index. It is 
nevertheless natural in this context to use quantities sold in Norway as weights, giving 
us a Laspeyres price index, which can be expressed as follows:  
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where Nq1  and 
Nq2  are quantities sold of products 1 and 2 in Norway. If the price 
index is more (less) than 100, this means that average prices abroad are higher (lower) 
than in Norway. However, it does not mean that all prices are higher abroad than in 
Norway. We can imagine that product 1 has a higher price abroad than in Norway 
( NU pp 11  ), while it is the converse for product 2 ( NU pp 22  ). The effect on the price 
index will thus be determined by the weighting, which in our case is determined the 
Norwegian consumption weights. If product 1 has a low sales volume relative to 
product 2 in Norway ( NN qq 21  ), this may give rise to a price index of less than 100, 
i.e. on average the price level in Norway is lower than abroad. 
 
For most price indices, we will use Norwegian quantity weightings. In this way, we 
measure what a Norwegian “shopping basket” costs abroad. If Norway is more 
expensive than the reference countries, the differences in the price index may be 
interpreted as the cost savings that could be achieved by importing the foreign price 
level. In Brekke, Holmås and Straume (2008) we also conducted sensitivity analyses 
where we used Swedish and Danish quantity weightings to see whether the price 
indices change. Such a comparison means that we import both foreign prices and 
foreign shopping baskets into Norway. The latter is a more unrealistic measure of 
possible cost savings. However, the results were fairly robust to these sensitivity 
checks. 
 
 
4.2. Price indices based on identical packs 
 
Let us first compare prices between countries for identical packs, i.e. packs with same 
size (e.g. 100 tablets), strength (e.g. 500 mg Paracetamol) and formulation (e.g. 
tablets). In the previous reports we selected the top-selling pack (measured in number 
of doses) in Norway for each substance, and compared the price of this pack with the 
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price of an identical pack in each reference country (given that this pack was sold in 
the reference country).14 This procedure gave us about 250 top-selling packs in 
Norway. While this is a standard procedure for price comparisons on the basis of 
packs, it severely reduces the size of the sample and is likely to make the sample 
biased and thus not representative. For instance, the most selling pack in Norway is 
not necessarily the most selling pack in Belgium. A cross-country price comparison 
should be based on a representative sample of the products sold in all countries 
subject to the analysis, not just the benchmark country (Norway in this case).  
 
In this report we have therefore refined our cross-country comparison of prices of 
identical packs. Instead of selecting only the top-selling pack for each substance, we 
now compare prices of all packs that are identical in Norway and the reference 
country. There are usually a wide range of packs with the same substance that are sold 
in Norway and the reference country. By including all identical packs – not just the 
top-selling pack for each substance – we are able to extend the sample for comparison 
of pack prices substantially. Indeed, the number of packs now increases from about 
250 to almost 1700 in Norway, which we try to match with the reference countries.  
 
There is one challenge with this approach, namely that there might be several 
identical packs within a country. For instance, there might be a parallel importer 
offering the same pack as the brand-name producer. For products that are off patent, 
there are usually one or more generic producers offering identical packs as the brand-
name producer. In this case, we have several prices for a given pack in each country. 
We handle this issue by computing the sales-weighted average price for this particular 
pack, which we argue is the most representable price for this pack in a given country. 
 
By extending the sample of products that form the basis for the pack price comparison 
we get a more representative sample of products not just in Norway but also in the 
reference country. To compute the price indices for the various market segments, we 
use the Norwegian consumption weights based on the number of doses sold for each 
pack. Using the number of packs instead of the number of doses would have created a 
bias towards smaller and thus cheaper packs. Thus, using doses as the basis for 
generating consumption weights is more appropriate. It is also consistent the rest of 
the price comparisons. 
 
We do not require the packs to be available in all countries (global) to be included in 
the calculation. The matching is carried out bilaterally for each country, so that the 
number of packs included varies depending on which country is the reference country. 
Having 1687 packs in Norway with a defined formulation, pack size and strength in 
our data, the number of matching packs varies from 1052 in Sweden to 519 in Austria. 
Table 4.1 below presents the results of the bilateral price indices computed for 
identical packs. The indices are computed using both wholesale (AIP) and retail 
(AUP) prices. 
 
 
                                                 
14 This is a standard approach used in many policy-oriented price comparisons of pharmaceuticals. In 
Norway this has been used by e.g. LMI (2006). See Danzon (1999) and Danzon and Chao (2000) for a 
critique of this method.  
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Table 4.1: Bilateral price indices at wholesale (AIP) and pharmacy (AUP) level based on prices of identical packs (same formulation, pack size 
and strength).  
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
All substances  
AIP per pack 100 115.5 137.2 101.6 97.9 146.5 112.4 120.7 114.0 135.7 
AUP per pack 100 111.5 125.7 113.8 82.3 147.7 112.3 112.9 125.1 124.3 
Number of substances 282 240 244 222 203 218 213 196 192 204 
Number of packs 1687 1052 955 887 541 807 654 559 519 515 
Substances on patent (without generic competition in Norway) 
AIP per pack 100 119.4 134.0 99.0 96.1 142.4 114.4 96.2 105.2 128.4 
AUP per pack 100 117.3 132.5 120.3 84.5 144.4 116.6 96.5 123.2 128.0 
Number of substances 165 132 135 115 110 118 117 102 104 107 
Number of packs 655 425 394 342 258 338 303 231 237 232 
Substances on patent in both countries (without generic competition in both countries) 
AIP per pack 100 124.1 137.9 104.3 99.7 147.8 120.4 102.6 100.5 131.1 
AUP per pack 100 122.5 137.6 129.9 88.4 150.2 125.9 104.8 117.2 133.2 
Number of substances  117 110 97 83 89 88 86 88 94 
Number of packs  369 312 282 213 271 241 200 204 212 
Substances off patent (with generic competition in Norway) 
AIP per pack 100 107.5 142.3 105.2 93.5 152.9 107.6 162.3 132.0 143.3 
AUP per pack 100 101.6 117.5 106.9 76.2 151.6 104.1 133.6 128.4 121.0 
Number of substances 117 108 109 107 93 100 96 94 88 97 
Number of packs 1032 627 561 545 283 469 351 328 282 283 
Substances off patent in both countries (with generic competition in both countries) 
AIP per pack 100 87.1 125.1 100.5 84.7 121.5 96.5 169.4 123.3 130.6 
AUP per pack 100 85.7 103.9 100.4 68.9 132.1 95.2 135.9 119.7 107.6 
Number of substances  98 94 98 83 91 90 82 77 83 
Number of packs  576 507 516 258 427 331 288 245 245 
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If we first look at the bilateral price indices for all substances (or packs) and rank the 
countries from cheapest to most expensive based on the pharmacy prices (AUP), we 
get the ranking showed in figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 Bilateral price indices, identical packs, pharmacy (AUP) and wholesale 
(AIP) prices, all substances. 
 
 
We see that UK is the cheapest country, having almost 18 per cent lower prices at 
pharmacy level than Norway, which is the second cheapest country. In the other end 
of the scale, we have Germany which is almost 48 per cent more expensive than 
Norway. Looking at the wholesale level, UK has just marginally lower prices than 
Norway, suggesting lower mark-ups at the pharmacy level in the UK. The same seems 
to be the case for Sweden, Belgium, Ireland and Denmark, whereas Finland, Austria 
and Germany seem to have slightly higher mark-ups at pharmacy level than in 
Norway. 
 
In table 4.1 we report bilateral price indices for the on-patent and the off-patent 
market segments. Since the exact patent status is not observed in each country, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, we use the de facto presence of generic competition 
for a given substance as an indicator for whether we classify the pharmaceuticals as 
on-patent or off-patent. To separate the two market segments, we use two different 
definitions: (i) whether the substance has generic sales in Norway; and (ii) whether 
the substance has generic sales in Norway and the reference country. If we do not 
observe generic competition for a given substance, then we label this as the on-patent 
market segment and compare prices of all identical packs with this substance in 
Norway and the reference country.   
 
Figure 4.2 reports the price index for the on-patent segment, where we have ranked 
the countries from cheapest to most expensive according to the price indices where we 
assume no generics in Norway and the reference country. The figure also reports the 
price index where we assume no generic sales in Norway for the substance. 
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Figure 4.2: Bilateral price indices, identical packs, pharmacy prices (AUP), on-patent 
market segment. 
 
 
As for all substances, UK is the cheapest country having almost 12 per cent lower 
prices on products where we do not observe generic sales in Norway and the UK. 
Germany is on the other end of the ranking being more than 50 per cent more 
expensive than Norway. Denmark has also high prices in the on-patent segment being 
almost 40 per cent more expensive than Norway. We see that the price index using 
only generic competition in Norway as the benchmark implies that the reference 
countries – except for Austria – become less expensive compared to Norway. This is 
expected as the definition opens up for a substance to face generic competition in the 
reference country (but not in Norway), and generic competition is likely to drive 
down prices. 
 
Finally, we compute the price indices for off-patent market segment. Figure 4.3 offers 
a ranking of price indices based on comparison of pharmacy prices of identical packs 
of pharmaceuticals with substances with generic competition. The countries are 
ranked from cheapest to most expensive according to the price index where the 
products face generic competition in Norway and the reference country. We see from 
Figure 4.3 that UK, Sweden and Netherlands have lower prices at pharmacy level than 
Norway if we restrict the price comparison to identical packs with substances that face 
generic competition. Indeed, the prices in the UK are more than 30 percent lower than 
in Norway, whereas Sweden and the Netherlands have almost 15 and 5 percent lower 
prices, respectively. In the other end of the scale, we find Belgium and Germany with 
36 and 32 percent higher prices, respectively. 
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Figure 4.3: Bilateral price indices, identical packs, pharmacy prices (AUP), off-patent 
market segment. 
 
 
 
Looking at the substances that have generic competition in Norway, but not 
necessarily in the reference country, we see that Norway becomes cheaper relative to 
its reference countries. In this case, only UK is cheaper than Norway, whereas 
Sweden has about the same price level. These results are expected as some substances 
might not yet have received generic competition in the reference country. The 
question of whether or not one should assume generic competition in both countries 
when comparing prices depends on the question one asks. There might be different 
market or regulatory conditions that explain why some countries experience generic 
entry sooner than other countries. These market and regulatory conditions might also 
be the very source to the lower price level. Thus, the question is whether one wants to 
“control” for that or not.  
 
A main problem with using price indices based on identical packs is, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, that the representativity of the sample of the products becomes 
low.15 In this report we have mitigated this concern to some degree by including all 
identical packs – not just the top-selling pack for each substance. This has increased 
our sample from about 250 packs to almost 1700 packs with a defined pack size, 
strength, and formulation in Norway. However, the number of matching packs is 
much lower and varies substantially across countries. As can be seen from table 4.1, 
Sweden has the highest number of identical packs, where we are able to match 1052 
packs, which is 62 per cent of the total number of packs in Norway. In the other end, 
we find Austria where we find 519 identical packs, which is only 30 per cent of the 
total number of packs in Norway. Clearly, the price comparisons based on identical 
packs generates great concern in terms of representativity. The price differences might 
be severely affected by selection bias, and thus systematically incorrect. To 
compensate for this, we proceed by using another and much more robust approach 
where price comparisons are based volume-weighted average substance (or dose) 
prices – a measure that uses almost all price and sales information in all countries. 
                                                 
15 See Danzon (1999) and Danzon and Chao (2000) for a full discussion and analysis of the problems 
associated with basing price indices on identical packs.  
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4.3. Price indices based on average substance prices 
 
For each substance in each country we compute the volume-weighted average dose 
price using each country’s sales volumes measured in standard units, as explained in 
more detail in the previous chapter. This gives us the most “representative” (dose) 
price for this substance in each country using all price and volume information 
available. We then compare these prices in Norway with the same prices in the 
reference country for each substance that are matched. As can be seen from table 4.2 
the number of matching substances is high, varying from 275 in Sweden to 251 in 
Belgium. This ensures a high degree of representativity in both Norway and the 
reference country, ensuring more robust measures of price differences.  
  
We start out by calculating bilateral price indices based on the average substance 
prices. The procedure is the same as for identical packs, apart from the fact that here 
we match active substances instead. Table 4.2 below presents all bilateral price 
indices we have calculated based on the average substance prices. 
 
We also compute what we refer to as global price indices, where we restrict the price 
comparison to substances that are present in all countries (global substances), not just 
between Norway and a given reference country. The results from the comparison 
based on global substances are reported in table 4.3 below. The benefit of the global 
price index is that the price difference between, say, Sweden and Denmark now 
becomes meaningful since the price indices are based on the same sample of 
substances. Under the bilateral price index, this is not the case. However, the 
drawback of the global price index is that the sample becomes smaller. Indeed, the 
number of matching substances is now reduced to 210. 
 
As for the price comparison based on identical packs, we compute separate price 
indices for the on-patent and the off-patent market segment, using exactly the same 
approach. 
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Table 4.2. Bilateral price indices at wholesale (AIP) and pharmacy (AUP) level based on volume-weighted average substance prices per dose.  
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
All substances  
AIP per dose 100 110,7 134,1 105,7 99,4 156,9 106,1 140,1 132,8 180,1 
AUP per dose 100 105,3 125,4 118,6 87,9 163,4 115,2 144,1 137,1 169,9 
Number of substances  275 272 264 261 263 268 251 261 260 
Substances on patent (without generic competition in Norway)  
AIP per dose 100 113,1 134,1 104,7 86,0 145,3 111,0 113,3 119,7 132,1 
AUP per dose 100 108,6 132,1 123,5 80,0 148,2 114,5 114,4 131,5 135,3 
Number of substances  160 157 151 145 153 154 141 146 147 
Substances on patent in both countries (without generic competition in both countries)  
AIP per dose 100 115.8 134.4 104.0 89.6 139.4 107.1 114.6 115.6 128.8 
AUP per dose 100 111.3 133.2 123.7 82.9 138.5 108.8 115.1 128.1 133.6 
Number of substances  141 129 127 109 114 116 118 62 127 
Substances off patent (with generic competition in Norway)  
AIP per dose 100 106,3 134,0 107,4 117,9 177,9 97,7 185,8 155,5 260,6 
AUP per dose 100 100,8 116,1 111,8 96,6 185,5 116,3 184,7 145,0 216,2 
Number of substances  115 115 113 116 110 114 110 115 113 
Substances off patent in both countries (with generic competition in both countries)  
AIP per dose 100 91,7 118,1 108,3 108,7 151,3 91,3 188,6 149,1 259,2 
AUP per dose 100 90,2 103,6 111,5 89,2 168,3 112,5 185,5 138,2 208,1 
Number of substances  103 98 101 101 100 106 94 98 95 
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Table 4.3. Global price indices (AIP and AUP) for substances present in all countries based on volume-weighted average substance prices per dose.  
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
All substances (N = 210) 
AIP per dose 100 113.0 131.5 105.6 94.7 156.4 105.9 139.0 132.8 172.2 
AUP per dose 100 108.3 124.2 121.5 84.6 161.1 115.4 142.2 139.9 164.6 
Substances on patent (without generic competition in Norway) (N = 112) 
AIP per dose 100 113.9 132.8 102.3 87.2 138.1 113.0 113.2 118.7 132.3 
AUP per dose 100 111.9 133.2 125.5 80.9 145.5 118.8 117.0 136.6 139.3 
Substances on patent in all countries (without generic competition in any country) (N = 73) 
AIP per dose 100 103.3 118.5 101.7 83.6 130.4 96.7 105.9 105.2 124.8 
AUP per dose 100 102.5 120.5 127.6 77.5 133.8 100.3 110.0 124.9 134.6 
Substances off patent (with generic competition in Norway) (N = 98) 
AIP per dose 100 111.8 129.8 110.3 105.4 182.3 95.7 175.3 152.7 228.5 
AUP per dose 100 104.2 114.0 117.0 88.8 178.9 111.6 170.9 143.6 193.5 
Substances off patent in all countries (with generic competition in all country) (N = 68)
AIP per dose 100 91.5 108.5 103.1 93.2 131.5 83.2 186.8 154.9 241.6 
AUP per dose 100 89.2 94.2 107.9 80.0 145.7 109.0 178.6 141.6 195.0 
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If we start looking at the bilateral price indices for all substances, figure 4.4 reports the 
ranking of countries from cheapest to most expensive at pharmacy price (AUP) level and also 
at the wholesale price (AIP) level. 
 
Figure 4.4: Bilateral indices, average substance prices, all substances. 
 
 
We see that, as for identical packs, UK still has lowest prices being about 12 per cent cheaper 
than Norway at pharmacy (AUP) level. Ireland is now the most expensive country with 
almost 70 per cent higher prices compared to Norway. At the wholesale level, UK has only 
marginally lower prices than Norway, suggesting a lower mark-up at the pharmacy level in 
the UK. We see that the price indices at wholesale (AIP) level produce almost the same 
ranking with just small differences that are due to differences in mark-ups.  
 
Looking at the different market segments, figure 4.5 below reports the results for the on-
patent segment based on the two different definitions where we match substances if there is 
generic competition in Norway and the reference country or just in Norway.  
 
Figure 4.5: Bilateral price indices, average substance prices at pharmacy (AUP) level, on-
patent substances. 
 
 
The UK is still the cheapest country with around 11 per cent lower pharmacy prices than 
Norway when matching only substances that face no generic sales in Norway and UK. 
Norway is the second cheapest country followed by the Netherlands and Sweden that are 
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around 9 and 11 per cent, respectively, more expensive than Norway. In the other end, we 
find Germany and Ireland that have about 38 and 33 per cent, respectively, higher prices than 
Norway in this segment. The results based on no generic competition in Norway, but not 
necessarily in the reference country, are almost the same, though there is a slight tendency 
that the reference countries are becoming less expensive relative to Norway as expected. 
 
Looking at the off-patent market segment, figure 4.6 reports the results from the bilateral price 
indices computed at pharmacy (AUP) level. 
 
Figure 4.6: Bilateral price indices, average substance prices at pharmacy (AUP) level, off-
patent substances. 
 
 
From this figure we see that UK and Sweden are 11 and 10 per cent, respectively, cheaper 
than Norway at pharmacy level for substances that face generic competition in both Norway 
and the reference country. Denmark is just marginally more expensive, whereas Ireland is 
more than 100 per cent more expensive in the off-patent market segment. The price indices 
based on generic competition in Norway show a tendency of making the reference countries 
more expensive as expected, though the differences are not large for most countries.  
 
Finally, we consider the global price indices based on average substance prices. The figure 
below shows the ranking of countries from cheapest to most expensive based on average 
substance prices at pharmacy (AUP) level for all substances. We have also added the bilateral 
price indices for comparison reasons.  
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Figure 4.7: Global and bilateral price indices, average substance prices at pharmacy (AUP) 
level, all substances. 
 
 
The figure shows that the global price indices produce the same ranking as the bilateral price 
indices in qualitative terms and almost the same results in quantitative terms. The 
neighbouring countries UK and Ireland are still the cheapest and most expensive countries, 
respectively, and the figures are almost the same. The benefit of the global price indices is 
that it offers a more precise measure of the price difference between two reference countries 
since the price indices are based on exactly the same match of substances. For instance, 
according to the global price indices for all substances, Denmark is almost 16 per cent more 
expensive than Sweden, whereas the same figure is 20 per cent if we use the bilateral price 
indices. However, there are three substances more in Sweden than in Denmark in the bilateral 
price indices, which makes this comparison inaccurate.  
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Chapter 5. Price indices for products under reference pricing (trinnpris) 
 
In this chapter we focus on the set of pharmaceuticals that are subject to the reference price 
scheme called “trinnpris” that was introduced in Norway in 2005. This scheme covers substances 
for which the patent has expired and generic competition has taken place.16 At the beginning of 
2010, 52 substances were subject to reference price (trinnpris) regulation in Norway. Our data set 
comprises information on all these substances. 
 
The reference price (trinnpris) defines the maximum reimbursement for a set of pharmaceuticals 
that are therapeutically equivalent (brand-names and generics). The reference price is usually set 
somewhere between the high-priced drug (brand-name) and the low-price drug (generic). In 
Norway, the maximum reimbursement (trinnpris) is set as discount of the brand-name price, 
which is reduced in steps over time, thereby the name “trinnpris” (step price).17 If patients 
demand product with a higher price than the maximum reimbursement, they would have to pay 
the full price difference out-of-pocket, as common for reference price systems. The idea is to 
make demand more price elastic, switching demand towards lower priced generics and trigger 
price competition between brand-names and generics, which would lead to lower pharmaceutical 
expenditures. See Chapter 2 for more details. 
 
The main reasons we provide a separate chapter on the pharmaceuticals under reference pricing 
(trinnpris) in Norway are the following. First, our analysis of the drugs under trinnpris regulation 
in previous reports was challenged by a NRK program called “Brennpunkt” in March earlier this 
year. We responded in a chronicle in Bergens Tidende on March 17, where we claimed there 
were several misunderstandings in the NRK program.18 Hopefully, writing a separate chapter 
devoting more space to our analysis on this part of the market would clarify things further.  
 
Second, the Ministry of Health scrutinised the prices that IMS Health had delivered for the 
market segment covered by the trinnpris regulation at the pharmacy (AUP) level. Comparing the 
IMS prices with the transaction prices in the database of the Norwegian Pharmacy Association 
showed a systematic bias. IMS had applied the regulated pharmacy margins to obtain prices at 
retail level. However, the true pharmacy margins turned out to be higher, implying higher prices 
at the pharmacy level for the products under trinnpris regulation. IMS have now provided us with 
the transacted prices at retail level for the substances under trinnpris regulation in Norway, which 
are used for the analysis in this report. 
 
Below we present the tables with the results from the different price indices calculated for the 
substances subject to reference pricing (trinnpris) regulation in Norway. The first table (5.1) 
presents the results for price indices based on comparison of pack prices of matching (identical) 
packs. The second table (5.2) presents the results for the price indices based on our preferred 
measure, namely the volume-weighted average substance prices.  
 
 
                                                 
16 However, some (five) of the substances under trinnpris regulation do not have generic competition in Norway. We 
will comment on that below.  
17 Details of the reference price system can be found in Chapter 2. 
18 The chronicle also appeared on http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2011/mars/283216 . 
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Table 5.1: Bilateral price indices (AIP and AUP) based on prices of identical packs (same formulation, size and strength). Substances under 
reference pricing (trinnpris). 
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
All substances 
AIP per pack 100 148.8 184.4 96.5 181.8 226.8 210.3 192.2 202.5 239.8 
AUP per pack 100 124.0 141.8 95.1 143.4 193.4 174.5 143.6 196.2 216.2 
Number of substances 51 50 50 50 43 46 45 46 46 46 
Number of packs 492 320 317 322 148 265 196 210 163 153 
Substances with generic competition in Norway and reference country 
AIP per pack 100 72.2 115.0 98.6 107.7 141.2 107.7 202.0 298.8 218.3 
AUP per pack 100 71.7 87.0 92.7 82.4 134.0 92.7 146.4 244.3 172.0 
Number of packs  266 261 295 116 219 158 180 126 122 
Substances with same competitive environment in Norway and reference country 
AIP per pack 100 127.3 162.4 98.8 112.9 192.6 205.8 201.2 260.8 210.7 
AUP per pack 100 108.4 123.7 93.0 87.4 169.5 169.5 146.3 228.9 173.1 
Number of packs  275 272 303 128 233 171 185 139 129 
 
Table 5.2. Bilateral price indices (AIP and AUP) based on volume-weighted average substance prices per dose. Substances under reference 
pricing (trinnpris). 
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
All substances 
AIP per dose 100 130.6 161.8 102.0 133.6 212.6 115.6 215.1 193.3 300.3 
AUP per dose 100 112.8 134.8 103.4 106.5 190.1 130.0 183.5 172.5 242.5 
Number of substances 52 51 52 52 51 49 49 51 52 51 
Substances with generic competition in Norway and reference country 
AIP per dose 100 81.5 106.8 104.7 99.8 164.1 83.5 186.7 180.1 305.9 
AUP per dose 100 77.8 90.8 103.3 81.8 155.2 111.4 165.8 154.5 233.4 
Number of substances  40 41 45 39 39   40 39 40 38 
Substances with same competitive environment in Norway and reference country 
AIP per dose 100 108.2 129.2 105.1 110.5 174.1 102.3 206.3 185.4 302.0 
AUP per dose 100 96.0 107.6 104.0 90.1 162.9 122.3 175.0 164.1 239.4 
Number of substances  42 43 47 41 41 42 42 43 41 
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5.1. All substances under reference pricing (trinnpris) 
Let us first look at all substances that are subject to reference pricing (trinnpris) in Norway. 
Figure 5.1 below shows the ranking of countries from cheapest to most expensive according to 
the bilateral price indices based on the volume-weighted average substance prices per dose at 
pharmacy (AUP) level. The figure also reports the same price indices for the identical packs. 
 
Figure 5.1. Bilateral price indices, substance and pack prices, pharmacy (AUP) level, all 
substances under reference pricing (trinnpris) in Norway. 
 
 
We see that Norway is the cheapest country using the average substance price indices, closely 
followed by Finland and UK that are 3.4 and 6.5 per cent more expensive, respectively. In the 
other end we find Ireland and Germany that have about 140 and 90 per cent higher prices than 
Norway, respectively. If we look at the price comparison based on identical packs, the pattern is 
fairly similar. However, there are some exceptions like UK, Netherlands and Austria that become 
much more expensive compared to Norway. Some countries, like Finland, Belgium and Ireland, 
also become cheaper when using identical packs as the basis for the price comparison. This 
variation is due to the change in the sample of products. The use of identical packs results in a 
loss of observations due to lack of matching across countries. Thus, the average substance prices 
are more reliable as measure of cross-country price differences. 
 
 
5.2. Substances with similar competitive environment 
Observing that generic competition takes place at different times in the countries in our sample, 
we might want to restrict the comparison to substances that face a similar competitive 
environment. As mentioned before, variation in generic entry across countries might be due 
country-specific regulations and market conditions. We therefore construct sub-indices for the set 
of pharmaceuticals under reference pricing (trinnpris) in Norway. First we compare prices if the 
substances have the same de facto patent status or competitive environment in Norway and the 
reference country. This implies that we exclude drugs that have generic competition in Norway, 
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but not in the reference country. Vice versa, we also exclude drugs that have generic competition 
in the reference country, but not in Norway. Figure 5.2 below reports the results from the bilateral 
price indices based on substances with same competitive environment. 
 
Figure 5.2. Bilateral price indices, substance and pack prices, pharmacy (AUP) level, substances 
with same competitive environment. 
 
 
Restricting the price comparison to the substances with the same competitive environment, we see 
that UK and Sweden are 8.3 and 4.6 per cent cheaper than Norway when using the volume-
weighted average substance price per dose. In the other end of the scale, we find Ireland and 
Belgium. We see there is a tendency to most countries becoming cheaper relative to Norway 
when restricting the comparison to substances that face similar competitive environment. The 
reason is of course the change in the sample of products that form the basis for the price 
comparison. There are some substances that have lower prices in Norway, most likely due to 
generic competition not present in the reference country, that are included in the reference price 
(trinnpris) system. We will look more carefully at that below. 
 
Looking at bilateral price indices using identical packs, we see that the pattern is fairly similar as 
for the substance prices. However, there are some exceptions like Austria and the Netherlands 
that become much more expensive when using matching packs, whereas Ireland and Belgium 
become much cheaper when using this approach.  
 
 
5.3. Substances with generic competition 
We have also computed a sub-index restricting attention to substances under reference pricing 
(trinnpris) that have generic competition in Norway and the reference country. This price index 
excludes all substances that are under reference pricing (trinnpris) regulation, but do not face 
generic competition in Norway or any other country. Table 5.1 and 5.2 provide the number of 
packs and substances this applies to. In Figure 5.3 below we present the ranking of countries 
according to this price index using prices at the pharmacy level (AUP).  
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Figure 5.3. Bilateral price indices, substance and pack price, pharmacy (AUP) level, substances 
under reference pricing (trinnpris) with generic competition in both countries. 
 
 
We see from the figure that Sweden, UK and Denmark have the lowest average substance prices 
when restriction the comparison to substances under trinnpris with generic competition in both 
Norway and the reference country. Sweden is now 22 per cent cheaper than Norway, whereas UK 
and Denmark has 18 and 9 per cent lower prices, respectively. In the other end of the scale, we 
find Ireland and Belgium that are, respectively, 133 and 65 per cent more expensive than 
Norway.  
 
Looking at the same price indices for identical packs, we see there are some dramatic changes in 
the ranking for some countries. In particular, Austria becomes much more expensive using 
matching packs as the basis, whereas Ireland becomes much cheaper. The reason is due to the 
change in the sample of products. In Austria and Ireland we find only 126 and 132 matching 
packs, respectively, for this sample of substances. With so few observations, the price indices 
might be highly sensitive to the exclusion or inclusion of particular products.  
 
Restricting the price comparison to substances with generic competition makes some countries 
cheaper compared to Norway, whereas others become more expensive. Compared with the “all 
substances” price indices, we see that particularly Sweden, Denmark and UK become much 
cheaper. However, the opposite is true for Finland, Belgium and Ireland, so the picture is not 
clear-cut.  
 
 
5.4. Price comparison between the Scandinavian countries 
Let us take a closer look at Sweden and Denmark to investigate in more detail what is driving the 
difference in the results in terms of the price indices for the substances under trinnpris regulation. 
In table A.2 in the Appendix we have listed all the 52 substances subject to the trinnpris scheme. 
This table also provides information on the consumption weight the substance is given in our 
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calculations. These weights reflect the Norwegian consumption pattern and are computed as the 
number of doses sold of a given substance divided by the total number of doses sold for this 
sample of substances, as explained in the previous chapter. The table also provides the average 
brand-name and generic price per dose for each substance, as well as the volume-weighted 
substance prices, which the prices we use to compute the price indices. The prices are reported 
for the Scandinavian countries at pharmacy (AUP) level. Finally, the table provides information 
about the sales volumes measured in doses for the brand-names, generics and in total at the 
substance level.  
 
The first set of price indices reported above used all substances under the trinnpris regulation. 
This was constructed by matching trinnpris substances with the same substances in the reference 
country. We see from table 5.2 that all of the 52 trinnpris substances were also sold in Denmark, 
whereas only one substance (Tamsulosin) was not sold in Sweden. This forms a good basis for 
price comparison as the sample is highly representative not just for Norway but also for Denmark 
and Sweden.  
 
However, we do observe that some substances do not face generic competition, so that the 
competitive environment is different. Indeed, when looking at the absence of generic 
competition, we can construct the following table (see also table A.2 in the Appendix).19 
 
Table 5.3. Trinnpris substances without generic sales (marked with X), Scandinavia.  
Substance name Norway Sweden Denmark 
Atorvastatin X X X 
Cabergoline X - - 
Donepezil - X X 
Mianserin X - - 
Mirtazapine X - - 
Olanzapine - X X 
Pivmecillinam - X - 
Prampipexole - X X 
Quetiapine - X X 
Ranitidine - - X 
Rivastigmine X X X 
Sibutramine - X X 
 
The table clearly shows significant variation across the Scandinavian countries with respect to 
whether the substances have generic competition or not. In Norway five of the 52 substances 
under trinnpris regulation do not have any generic sales (only brand-name sales, despite the fact 
that they have been included in the reference price (trinnpris) regulation. In Denmark and Sweden 
8 of the 52 trinnpris substances do not have generic sales. Notice that these are not the same 8 
substances.  
 
                                                 
19 Note that some substances also do not have brand-name sales, but only 100 percent generic sales in the 
Scandinavian countries (see table A.2 in the Appendix). We have, however, included these in the comparisons, since 
the main distinction is between whether a substance has generic sales or not. 
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Interestingly, there is far from perfect overlap between the countries when looking at the absence 
of generic competition. The substances Atorvastatin and Rivastigmine do not have generic 
competition in any of the three countries. However, the substances Cabergoline, Mianserin and 
Mirtazapine have generic sales in Denmark and Sweden, but not in Norway. The substance 
Pivmecillinam has generic competition in Norway and Denmark, but not in Sweden, whereas the 
substance Ranitidine has generic competition in Norway and Sweden, but not in Denmark. The 
rest of the substances listed in table 5.3 have generic competition in Norway, but not in Denmark 
and Sweden.  
 
In the sub-index called price indices with same competitive environment we match substances 
that have or do not have generic competition in both Norway and the relevant reference country. 
This means that for the comparison of the price level between Norway and Denmark all the drugs 
listed in table 5.3 except for Atorvastatin, Ranitidine and Rivastigmine would drop out of the 
price comparison between Norway and Denmark, resulting in a price comparison based on 43 
substances. The same procedure applies to Sweden and the rest of the reference countries.  
 
The final sub-index we computed restricts price comparisons only to the trinnpris substances 
where we observe generic competition in Norway and the reference country. This implies that we 
lose all five substances without generic competition in Norway (Atorvastatin, Cabergoline, 
Mianserin, Mirtazapine and Rivastigmine). In addition, we also lose all substances without 
generic competition in the reference country. For price comparison with Denmark this implies 
that all of the substances listed in table 5.3, except for Ranitidine, are not included, yielding in 
total a reduction of 11 substances. 
 
The question is which of the price indices offers the “right” picture of the price levels between 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden or any of the other reference countries. Our view on this is that it 
depends on the question that one asks. If the question simply is what would the consumption of 
drugs under trinnpris regulation cost if we imported the prices in Sweden or Denmark. The 
answer is, looking at table 5.2, that it would cost us 12.8 per cent more if we import the Swedish 
prices or 34.8 per cent more if we import the Danish prices. 
 
However, some would argue that we are now comparing “apples with oranges” since some of the 
products in Sweden and Denmark are not having generic sales. Looking closer at this argument 
tells us also that some of the trinnpris substances do not have generic sales in Norway either. In 
fact, we observe quite a large variation across countries in terms of whether the substances do 
have generic competition. Some have generic competition in Sweden, but not in Denmark. The 
same pattern applies to the rest of the reference countries.  
 
One interesting question is why we observe such variation in generic competition across 
European countries for the same substances. First, patent regulation is to a large extent 
harmonized across Europe, implying that cross-country variation in generic competition must be 
due to national differences in implementation and/or enforcement of the patent legislation if this 
is the reason. Second, price controls and reimbursement policies (like price caps and reference 
pricing) vary substantially across countries, stimulating generic competition in different degrees. 
Third, market conditions (market size, income, morbidity, etc.) are likely to influence the 
profitability of generic competition. 
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If we restrict our sample to comparisons only of prices of substances with generic competition, 
we rule out the price effects of national variations in regulation and reimbursement policies, 
which many people would argue is the very source of difference of prices across Europe. 
Whether this is reasonable or not depend on the question that is asked. If the question is what the 
Norwegian consumption of the products under trinnpris regulation cost if we import the foreign 
price levels, then the overall price indices for this group of products would provide the answer. 
The low price level in Norway could then be explained by the trinnpris scheme, the market 
incentives for generic entry, the patent regulation, the price regulation, the reimbursement level, 
etc. The price indices provide a descriptive measure of price levels, and do not say anything 
about the source of the low price level. If we restrict the price comparison to substances which 
face generic competition in Norway and the reference country, then we control for the fact that 
different countries have different competitive environments irrespective if this is due patent 
regulation, reimbursement policies, price regulations, etc. The question is thus what we would 
like to analyse. 
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Chapter 6. Price indices for brand-name and generic drugs in the 
off-patent market 
 
 
In this chapter we compute separate price indices for brand-name and generic drugs in the off-
patent market segment where the brand-name producers face competition from generic 
producers.20 When computing the brand-name (generic) price indices, we exclude all generic 
(brand-name) sales, and use the Norwegian consumption of brand-names (generics) as weights. 
We compute bilateral price indices for brand-name and generic products that are common to 
Norway and each reference country. The comparisons are based on pack prices or (volume-
weighted) average substance (dose) prices, as in the previous chapters. We compute overall price 
indices for the brand-names and generics, but also the sub-indices for the products subject to 
reference pricing (trinnpris) in Norway. We first report the results for the brand-name price 
indices, and then for the generic price indices.  
 
 
6.1. Price comparisons of brand-name drugs in the off-patent market 
The bilateral price indices for brand-name products based on prices of matching packs and on 
volume-weighted average dose prices of matching substances are reported below in table 6.1 and 
6.2, respectively. We see from the tables that Norway consistently has the lowest brand-name 
prices irrespectively of whether we base the comparisons at pack or substance level.  
 
Comparing prices of identical brand-name packs, we see that Norway has the lowest prices at 
both wholesale (AIP) and pharmacy (AUP) level. At pharmacy level, UK and Belgium has the 
second and third lowest price levels, being 7.8 and 20.6 per cent more expensive than Norway, 
respectively. In the other end of the scale, we find Denmark and Germany with almost 80 per 
cent higher brand-name prices.  
 
The same picture appears for the subsample of brand-name products (with generic competition) 
that are under reference price (trinnpris) regulation, with the exception of UK that is about 6 per 
cent cheaper than Norway at pharmacy (AUP) level. For this subgroup of brand-name drugs, 
Denmark and Germany have about 130 to 140 per cent higher brand-name prices than Norway.  
 
As mentioned before, a major problem with comparing pack prices is that the sample of products 
is not representative for Norway or the reference countries. The reason is due to the large 
variation across countries in pack sizes, formulations and strengths, which reduce the sample of 
products in both countries. For instance, we see from table 6.1 that the number of matching 
brand-name packs between Norway and Sweden is 246. Comparing this with the total number of 
brand-name packs (with generic competition) in the sample, we see from table 3.2 that the 
number is 461 in Norway and 652 in Sweden. Thus, we lose about half of the packs sold in 
Norway and almost 2/3 of the packs sold in Sweden. We therefore focus on the volume-weighted 
average substance prices in the following.  
 
                                                 
20 Note that the price indices for brand-name products in the on-patent segment (without generic competition) are 
reported in Chapter 4, Table 4.1-4-3. 
SNF Report No. 11/11 
 
 
 
40
Table 6.1: Bilateral price indices for brand-name products with generic competition based on prices of identical packs at wholesale (AIP) and 
pharmacy (AUP) level. 
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
Indices brand names 
AIP per pack 100 153.0 192.9 106.1 132.0 169.4 135.2 116.2 121.4 181.8 
AUP per pack 100 158.9 179.7 125.9 107.8 179.4 128.8 120.6 128.8 168.2 
Number of substances  68 56 59 48 51 44 46 40 46 
Number of packs  246 202 236 131 139 126 106 107 117 
Indices brand names subject to reference pricing (trinnpris)
AIP per pack 100 182.3 270.3 107.7 114.9 226.2 172.6 114.9 100.9 154.9 
AUP per pack 100 171.1 242.8 128.0 94.3 230.5 151.7 117.0 101.5 138.9 
Number of substances  33 27 32 26 26 19 26 23 24 
Number of packs  134 104 144 73 78 64 71 60 64 
 
 
Table 6.2: Bilateral price indices for brand-name products with generic competition based on volume-weighted substance (dose) prices at 
wholesale (AIP) and pharmacy (AUP) level 
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
Indices brand names 
AIP  100 141.1 208.4 119.4 136.8 200.4 127.8 169.1 108.4 138.7 
AUP  100 137.5 194.2 139.8 118.6 214.8 134.8 176.8 116.5 131.8 
Number of substances  89 71 83 84 84 87 79 78 77 
Indices brand names subject to reference pricing (trinnpris) 
AIP  100 172.5 286.2 110.8 165.9 204.3 140.2 155.4 115.2 137.7 
AUP  100 164.9 261.5 131.0 143.2 209.8 150.2 161.9 124.9 131.2 
Number of substances  38 34 41 39 38 38 39 37 37 
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From table 6.2 we see that the bilateral price indices based on average substance dose prices 
produce a qualitatively similar picture as the indices based on prices of identical packs. Indeed, 
Norway has the lowest prices on brand-name (facing generic competition) across the ten 
European countries. However, the indices are not identical in quantitative terms. At pharmacy 
(AUP) level, Austria and UK have 16.5 and 18.6 per cent, respectively, higher brand-name prices 
than Norway. In the other end of the scale, we find Denmark and Germany with 94.2 and 114.8 
per cent higher brand-name prices, respectively, than Norway.  
 
Considering the subsample of brand-names that are subject to reference pricing (trinnpris), the 
same picture appears. Norway is still the cheapest country, followed by Austria and Finland that 
have 25 and 31 per cent higher prices, respectively. In this category of products, Denmark has by 
far the highest brand-name price level being 161 per cent more expensive than Norway.  
 
The use of average substance prices generates a more representative sample. First, the number of 
matching substances increases using this approach. This can be readily verified by comparing 
table 6.1 and 6.2. For instance, the number of matching substances between Norway and Sweden 
is 89 when using average substance prices, whereas the same figure is 68 when basing the 
comparison on identical packs. Second, the average substance price is computed using all sales 
information. Thus, the number of packs that forms the basis for price comparisons is much 
higher, and thus more representative.  
 
 
6.2. Price comparisons of generic drugs 
We now proceed by considering the bilateral price indices for generic drugs, excluding all brand-
name sales from the computations. First, we compare prices of identical packs. For generic 
products this raises a special concern, since there are several generic producers often offering the 
same pack. Thus, we need to generate a “representative” pack price when we have multiple 
generic producers offering the same pack. We do so by computing the volume-weighted average 
generic pack price using country-specific sales volumes, which we claim is the most 
representative pack price in each country when the same pack is offered by several generic 
producers. Second, we compare the volume-weighted average substance price of generic products 
across countries, where the procedure is as in the previous analysis. 
 
If we look at the bilateral indices based on prices of matching packs in table 6.3, we see that most 
countries are cheaper than Norway. Indeed, in UK generic drug prices are about 45 per cent 
lower than in Norway at pharmacy level. Thus, if Norway “imported” the UK pharmacy price 
level, a cost-saving of 45 per cent on the generic drug sales could be realized. The only countries 
that have higher generic drug prices than Norway are Germany and Belgium when we base our 
comparisons on identical packs.  
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Table 6.3: Bilateral price indices for generic drugs based on identical packs at wholesale (AIP) and retail (AUP) level. 
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
Indices for generic substances 
AIP per pack 100 65.1 102.1 96.2 65.9 117.3 72.5 213.0 90.5 128.4 
AUP per pack 100 70.5 78.5 85.8 54.4 127.3 80.2 141.8 76.9 97.0 
Number of substances  88 87 87 62 75 71 68 64 63 
Number of packs  356 326 328 136 269 191 186 147 138 
Indices for generic substances subject to reference pricing (trinnpris) 
AIP per pack 100 53.5 84.2 97.3 102.1 142.8 103.6 241.7 178.0 381.4 
AUP per pack 100 56.9 59.8 81.2 67.0 126.0 86.5 149.7 125.7 247.3 
Number of substances  39 40 42 25 37 33 35 34 32 
Number of packs  174 176 197 63 149 103 128 81 78 
 
 
Table 6.4: Bilateral price indices for generic drugs based on volume-weighted average substance dose prices at wholesale (AIP) and retail (AUP) 
level.  
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland UK Germany Netherlands Belgium Austria Ireland 
Indices for generic substances 
AIP per dose 100 86.5 126.2 104.3 123.0 160.8 95.1 196.8 190.2 371.6 
AUP per dose 100 84.1 100.0 96.9 93.2 175.1 114.9 173.7 156.0 258.9 
Number of substances  103 98 101 101 100 106 94 98 95 
Indices for generic substances subject to reference pricing (trinnpris) 
AIP per dose 100 64.9 104.2 111.8 106.5 196.5 73.8 222.0 238.0 500.7 
AUP per dose 100 63.9 78.1 93.6 78.5 159.1 109.1 156.1 171.5 315.3 
Number of substances  40 41 45 39 39 40 39 40 38 
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If we look at the sub-indices based on the generic products that are subject to reference pricing 
(trinnpris) in Norway, we see that the cheapest country is Sweden with about 43 per cent lower 
prices on generic drugs than Norway. For this subsample of generic products, Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, and Ireland have higher prices than Norway. Notice, however, how sensitive the results 
are to the sample of products. If we look at Ireland, we see that they have about the same price 
level of generic drugs as Norway if we compare all matching packs of generic drugs. However, if 
we restrict the sample to generic products subject to reference pricing (trinnpris) in Norway, 
Ireland is suddenly 147 per cent more expensive than Norway. This illustrates our main point 
about generating a representative sample.  
 
Comparing prices of identical packs ensures a high degree of precision, but is likely to generate a 
non-representative sample of products in Norway and the reference countries due to the severe 
reduction in the number of packs that forms the basis for the price comparisons, as illustrated by 
the case of Ireland. Comparing the number of matching generic packs in table 6.3 with the total 
number of generic packs on the market in Norway and the reference countries given by table 3.3, 
we see a significant difference. For instance, the number of generic packs is 600 in Norway and 
1020 in Sweden, whereas the number of matching generic packs is 356. Thus, we lose about half 
of the packs in Norway and 2/3 of the packs in Sweden, when computing price indices based on 
identical packs. The resulting figures are likely to be biased and non-representative for the 
difference in price levels between Norway and the reference countries. 
 
To ensure a higher degree of representativity, we compute bilateral price indices based on the 
sales-weighted average substance prices. As described above, this approach exploits price and 
sales information of all products that are sold in each country. The sample of generic products 
that forms the basis for the computation of the price indices is much larger and more likely to 
generate representative prices for each country. 
 
The results are reported in table 6.3. If we look at all generic products, Sweden comes out as the 
cheapest country with about 16 per cent lower prices than Norway. UK and Finland also have 
lower prices of generic drugs, whereas Denmark has about the same price level as Norway. In the 
other end of the scale, we find Ireland with more than 150 per cent higher generic drug prices 
than Norway. Also Germany and Belgium have fairly high prices of generic drugs.  
 
If we look at the sub-indices for the generic products that are subject to reference pricing 
(trinnpris) in Norway, we see that Sweden is still the cheapest country. The price difference is 
now larger with Sweden having about 36 per cent lower prices on this sample of generic drugs.  
Also Denmark, Finland and UK have lower prices on the generic drugs that are under reference 
pricing (trinnpris) in Norway. In the other end of the scale, we find Ireland, Austria, Germany 
and Belgium, which all have significantly higher prices than Norway for this sample of generic 
drugs. 
 
Looking only at the generic sales, we see that the price level in Norway is no longer at the low-
price end. Our results point at potential cost savings for Norway in the generic market segment, 
especially by importing prices from Sweden, which has the lowest prices on the generic products 
in our sample. However, this conclusion does not account for the prices and sales of brand-names 
that face generic competition. Indeed, we found that Norway had consistently the lowest brand-
name prices in the off-patent market segment. Thus, the net effect of importing foreign price 
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levels is much more moderate when accounting for the brand-name price level. In fact, as shown 
in the previous chapters, there is not much to gain in terms for cost-savings if we import the 
prices for both brand-names and generics.  
 
Whether cost-savings can be realized by importing generic prices from, say, Sweden would 
depend on the regulatory mechanism that the government would impose and on the market 
dynamics. For instance, it would be important to know how the brand-name and generic 
producers respond in terms of pricing and sales effort to various regulatory schemes. As pointed 
out in, for instance, Brekke, Grasdal and Straume (2009) and Brekke, Holmås and Straume 
(2011) the response from pharmaceuticals producers can be very different depending on whether 
one uses price caps or reference prices to reduce pharmaceutical expenditures.  
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7. Regression analyses 
 
In this part of the report we analyse differences in pharmacy prices and margins using regression 
analyses. An advantage of this kind of analysis compared with calculating indices is that it is 
possible to study price differences between countries corrected for the fact that other aspects may 
also vary. We have for example seen that pack size varies considerably. Correcting for pack size 
in the regressions means (in somewhat simplified terms) that we compare prices between 
countries for identical pack sizes. In the analyses we would also like to correct for the proportion 
of each active substance sold as tablets. When we analyse price differences for all active 
substances, we also include a variable controlling for whether or not there is generic competition. 
We have also tried to use the strength of the pharmaceutical as an explanatory variable, but as 
this had no significant effect we have chosen to omit this variable from the analyses. In analyses 
of this kind, we can also correct for the fact that not all countries are represented with the same 
active substances in the data set. We do this by including a dummy variable for each active 
substance21, which implies that we are comparing the prices of the identical active substances. In 
these analyses, we will therefore expect the results (the differences between the countries) to be 
less sensitive to which active substances we include in the analyses.  
 
 
7.1. Pharmacy prices (AUP) 
In the regression analyses, we have chosen to focus on volume-weighted average prices (see 
Chapter 4 for an explanation of how these have been calculated). In these analyses, we use 
dummy variables to identify price differences between countries. In other words, we have, for 
each country, constructed a variable with value 1 for all price observations for that country, while 
the variable has the value 0 for price observations for all other countries. As we have 10 
countries, we obtain 10 such dummy variables. To be able to identify the effect of these variables, 
i.e. how much of the price differences they explain, we must omit a variable. We have chosen to 
omit the variable for Norway, which means that we compare prices in the other countries with 
prices in Norway. For example, we can see from the results in Table 7.1 below that the estimated 
effect of the variable "Finland" is 0.094, which means that prices in Finland are 9.4 per cent 
higher than in Norway (this interpretation is due to the fact that prices are in logarithmic form). A 
negative value could accordingly be interpreted as how many per cent lower the average price 
was, compared with the price level in Norway. However, it is important to note whether or not 
the estimated effect of the variable is statistically significant. If we consider the coefficient for 
"Denmark", this has a value equal to 0.057. As this is not statistically significant (coefficients that 
are statistically significant are asterisked), we conclude that average prices in Denmark do not 
differ from those in Norway. 
 
In Table 7.1 we present the results from regression analyses where we use all active substances 
(columns 2-4) and only global active substances (columns 5-7). We further distinguish the active 
substances according to whether they are on or off patent. In the same way as when we compared 
price levels using indices, we also find here that Norway proves to have relatively low 
pharmaceutical prices. As expected, the results are relatively similar if we analyse the entire 
sample of pharmaceuticals or only consider the sample of global pharmaceuticals. When 
                                                 
21 We estimate fixed effect models. 
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discussing the results, we therefore only focus on the total sample. We can also see from the table 
that the price differences are not as great as when we compared the price indices in the previous 
chapter. Part of the reason for this may be that, in this part of the analysis, we do not weight the 
prices with Norwegian consumption weights. 
 
If we focus on all substances for the entire sample (column 2), we find that Germany and Ireland 
have clearly the highest prices, approximately 35 and 22 per cent higher respectively than in 
Norway. Austria, Belgium, Finland and Netherlands also have higher prices (from 8.3 to 16.3 per 
cent higher) than in Norway, while Denmark and Sweden have price levels that do not differ 
significantly from the Norwegian price level. United Kingdom is the only country with a price 
level significantly lower than Norway (31 per cent). 
 
Table 7.1 Differences in pharmacy prices (AUP), volume-weighted substance prices. 
 Total sample Global substances 
 All 
substances 
Substances 
without 
generic 
competition 
Substances 
with generic 
competition 
All 
substances 
Substances 
without 
generic 
competition 
Substances 
with generic 
competition 
Sweden -0.017 
(0.037) 
0.056*
(0.035) 
-0.130*
(0.074) 
-0.033 
(0.043) 
0.060 
(0.040) 
-0.155**
(0.079) 
Denmark 0.057 
(0.038) 
0.202***
(0.036) 
-0.155**
(0.075) 
0.024
(0.044) 
0.199*** 
(0.041) 
-0.193***
(0.080) 
Finland 0.094** 
(0.038) 
0.168*** 
(0.036) 
-0.025
(0.074) 
0.103** 
(0.043) 
0.206*** 
(0.041) 
-0.033
(0.079) 
Netherlands 0.083** 
(0.038) 
0.058*
(0.035) 
0.071 
(0.074) 
0.057 
(0.043) 
0.063 
(0.041) 
0.005 
(0.079) 
Austria 0.163*** 
(0.038) 
0.157*** 
(0.037) 
0.154**
(0.074) 
0.173*** 
(0.043) 
0.170*** 
(0.041) 
0.166**
(0.080) 
United Kingdom -0.305*** 
(0.038) 
-0.302*** 
(0.037) 
-0.350*** 
(0.074) 
-0.324*** 
(0.043) 
-0.284*** 
(0.041) 
-0.403*** 
(0.079) 
Belgium 0.102** 
(0.044) 
0.062 
(0.040) 
0.138*
(0.082) 
0.121** 
(0.050) 
0.082* 
(0.046) 
0.173**
(0.088) 
Germany 0.345*** 
(0.038) 
0.288*** 
(0.035) 
0.383*** 
(0.075) 
0.335*** 
(0.043) 
0.295*** 
(0.041) 
0.340*** 
(0.079) 
Ireland 0.218*** 
(0.0038) 
0.195*** 
(0.036) 
0.238*** 
(0.074) 
0.204*** 
(0.043) 
0.205*** 
(0.041) 
0.207*** 
(0.079) 
Pack size -0.0024*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0028*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0004) 
Proportion tablets -0.113*** 
(0.046) 
-0.051 
(0.040) 
-0.179**
(0.092) 
-0.175*** 
(0.044) 
-0.024 
(0.044) 
-0.061 
(0.097) 
Generic competition -0.157*** 
(0.038) 
- - -0.175***
(0.044) 
- - 
Constant 2.401*** 
(0.040) 
3.029*** 
(0.036) 
1.423*** 
(0.077) 
2.173*** 
(0.047) 
2.728*** 
(0.043) 
1.344*** 
(0.084) 
Dummy for molecule yes yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
Number of molecules 282 164 118 210 112 98 
Number of 
observations 
2657 1518 1139 2100 1120 980 
R2 0.173 0.226 0.175 0.172 0.232 0.174 
***: significant at 1 per cent level. **: significant at 5 per cent level. *: significant at 10 per cent level.  
 
In the same way as previously, we also distinguish active substances according to whether or not 
they have generic competition in Norway. If we focus on the total sample of active substances for 
SNF Report No. 11/11 
 
 
 
47
which we do not observe generic competition (column 3 in the Table), we see that Norway has 
significantly lower pharmaceutical prices than all other countries with the exception of the United 
Kingdom and Belgium. Average pharmaceutical prices for active substances without generic 
competition are approximately 30 per cent lower in the United Kingdom than in Norway, while 
the price level in Belgium is not significantly different from that in Norway. For the other 
countries, the ranking is as follows (with the relative price difference from Norway in brackets): 
Germany (29%), Denmark (20%), Ireland (20%), Finland (17%), Austria (16%), the Netherlands 
(6%) and Sweden (6%). 
 
If we consider price differences for pharmaceuticals with generic competition, we find that 
United Kingdom (35%), Denmark (16%) and Sweden (13%) have significantly lower prices than 
Norway (see column 4). For Finland and the Netherlands we do not find significantly different 
prices compared to Norway, while the price levels in Germany (38%), Ireland (24%), Austria 
(15%) and Belgium (14%) are higher all than in Norway.  
 
 
7.2. Pharmacy margins  
In Table 7.2 below, we present the results from regression analyses in which we analyse how 
pharmacy margins vary between countries. We carry out the same classification of active 
substances as above (all active substances in the sample, active substances available in all 
countries (global), active substances without generic competition in Norway and active 
substances with generic competition in Norway) and use the same explanatory variables. The 
dependent variable (pharmacy percentage margin) is given by 
 
AUP
AIPAUPM  , 
 
Where AUP and AIP are calculated as volume-weighted average prices. In the same way as 
previously, we use dummy variables to identify differences between countries. We use Norway 
as a comparison country; if we look at Table 7.2, column 2, we find for example that Denmark 
has a value equal to -0.020. This means that the (percentage) margin is on average 2 percentage 
points lower in Denmark than in Norway. If we start by looking at all active substances, we see, 
as above, that the results vary little whether we use the total sample or only the global active 
substances. Focusing on the former, we find that Finland has clearly the highest percentage 
margins, 10.5 percentage points higher than in Norway. The average margin in Norway is 17.9 
per cent (given by the constant in the model), i.e. the average margin in Finland is 28.4 per cent 
(17.9 + 10.5). The Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Belgium also have significantly higher 
percentage margins than Norway, while United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have lower 
margins. Pharmacy margins in Sweden are not significantly different from those in Norway.  
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Table 7.2 Differences in pharmacy percentage margins.  
 Total sample Global substances 
 All 
substances 
Substances 
without 
generic 
competition 
Substances 
with generic 
competition 
All 
substances 
Substances 
without 
generic 
competition 
Substances 
with generic 
competition 
Sweden 0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.023
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
Denmark -0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.050*** 
(0.015) 
-0.021**
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.051***
(0.015) 
Finland 0.105*** 
(0.008) 
0.150*** 
(0.008) 
0.043*** 
(0.014) 
0.107*** 
(0.009) 
0.163*** 
(0.009) 
0.044*** 
(0.015) 
Netherlands 0.086*** 
(0.008) 
0.058*** 
(0.008) 
0.127*** 
(0.014) 
0.090*** 
(0.009) 
0.059*** 
(0.008) 
0.130*** 
(0.015) 
Austria 0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.092*** 
(0.008) 
-0.048***
(0.015) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.108*** 
(0.009) 
-0.057*** 
(0.015) 
United Kingdom -0.078*** 
(0.009) 
-0.067***
(0.008) 
-0.093*** 
(0.014) 
-0.076
(0.010) 
-0.063*** 
(0.009) 
-0.090*** 
(0.015) 
Belgium 0.025** 
(0.010) 
0.037***
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
Germany 0.059*** 
(0.008) 
0.050*** 
(0.008) 
0.076*** 
(0.015) 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
0.057*** 
(0.009) 
0.068*** 
(0.015) 
Ireland -0.051*** 
(0.0008) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
-0.146*** 
(0.014) 
-0.052*** 
(0.009) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.145*** 
(0.015) 
Pack size -0.0001 
(0.0006) 
-0.0003***
(0.0001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0007) 
-0.0003 
(0.0008) 
-0.0005 
(0.0010) 
-0.0001
(0.0001) 
Proportion tablets 0.035*** 
(0.010) 
0.0122 
(0.0093) 
0.060***
(0.018) 
0.027***
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.048***
(0.019) 
Generic competition 0.026*** 
(0.008) 
- - 0.016***
(0.010) 
- - 
Constant 0.179*** 
(0.009) 
0.144*** 
(0.008) 
0.271*** 
(0.015) 
0.192*** 
(0.010) 
0.127*** 
(0.010) 
0.285*** 
(0.016) 
Dummy for molecule yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of molecules 282 164 118 210 112 98 
Number of 
observations 
2657 1518 1139 2100 1120 980 
R2 0.269 0.402 0.370 0.281 0.469 0.376 
***: significant at 1 per cent level. **: significant at 5 per cent level. *: significant at 10 per cent level.  
 
If we distinguish the active substances according to whether or not we observe generic 
competition (column 3 and 4), the results change somewhat. Focusing on substances without 
generic competition, we find that only United Kingdom has significantly lower pharmacy 
margins than Norway. Pharmacy margins in Sweden and Denmark seem to be equal to those in 
Norway, while all other countries have significantly higher margins. For substances with generic 
competition, Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark and Austria have significantly lower pharmacy 
margins than Norway. Sweden and Belgium have margins at the Norwegian level, while the 
Netherlands, Germany and Finland have significantly higher pharmacy margins.  
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8. Concluding remarks 
 
In this study we have compared prices of pharmaceuticals in Norway with the following nine 
Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, UK and Sweden. These reference countries comprise the basket for the Norwegian 
price cap regulation and are considered to be fairly similar and comparable countries. The 
purpose of this study has been to develop a sound method for cross-country price comparisons of 
pharmaceuticals and to analyse what the Norwegian consumption of pharmaceuticals would cost 
if we imported the prices from our reference countries. 
 
To analyse these questions, we have made use of data from IMS Health containing detailed sales 
information of a large set of pharmaceuticals in the ten European countries for the first six 
months of 2010. The data cover all prescription bound sales in Norway and the reference 
countries for the 300 most selling substances in Norway. The data contain monthly information 
of prices and volumes (number of packs and doses) at wholesale and retail level per pack and per 
dose, as well as other details such as manufacturer, product type (brand-name or generic), pack 
size, strength, presentation form, etc. 
 
Since pharmaceuticals are heterogeneous products, there is a trade-off between precision and 
representativity when doing the price comparisons. We have made use of two different 
approaches that fulfil these criteria in opposite degrees. First, we compared prices of identical 
packs. This approach maximizes precision, but has the disadvantage that the sample is likely to 
become non-representative due to a large reduction in the number of packs that constitute the 
basis for price comparisons. Thus, the resulting price differences would be biased and potentially 
incorrect, since they are not representative for the price level in Norway and/or the reference 
countries. Second, we compared volume-weighted average substance (dose) prices. This measure 
makes use of all price and sales information in each country, and thus maximizes the degree of 
representativity in the price comparisons. We have argued that using average substance (dose) 
prices is a more reliable approach to measure price differences across countries, since it is 
generally based on a larger and more representative sample of products.  
 
We have computed a large set of price indices based on pack prices or substance prices using the 
Norwegian consumption pattern as the benchmark. First, we have computed price indices for the 
whole sample of products. These indices showed that Norway only UK had lower prices at retail 
level. This finding was robust to whether we compared prices of identical packs or average 
substance prices. In the other end of the scale we found Germany and Ireland. Second, we 
restricted the price comparisons to on-patent products (i.e., brand-names without generic 
competition). The price indices for this sample of products were very similar to the overall price 
indices, with only UK having a lower price level than Norway. These findings suggest limited 
scope for cost-savings by importing prices of pharmaceuticals from our reference countries. 
 
Third, we restricted attention to products under reference price (trinnpris) regulation in Norway. 
Since this group of products got special attention in the media lately, we described in greater 
detail our data, method for comparison, and results. In particular, we produced a separate table of 
prices and sales in the Scandinavian countries, and computed different price indices depending on 
whether or not we observed generic competition in Norway and/or the reference countries. If 
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compared prices of all products under trinnpris regulation, we found that Norway had the lowest 
price level. However, when we restricted the sample to products that faced the same competitive 
situation (i.e., generic competition or not) in Norway and the reference countries, then UK and 
Sweden became cheaper, whereas the rest of the countries were still more expensive than 
Norway. Finally, we compared the prices of products that faced generic competition in Norway 
and the reference countries. In this case, also Denmark had a lower price level. Thus, there seems 
to be some potential for cost savings on the products that face generic competition, but not for the 
overall set of products, including the brand-name sales, under trinnpris regulation. 
 
Fourth, we computed separate price indices for brand-name and generic products in the off-patent 
market segment. The bilateral price indices for these two groups of products showed very 
different rankings. For the brand-name products (with generic competition), Norway had the 
lowest prices, whereas for the generic products the price level in Norway were more at the 
average or higher end of the scale. The same picture appeared for the brand-name and generic 
products subject to reference pricing (trinnpris). Thus, our results suggest a potential for cost-
savings on generic drugs if we could import prices from low-price countries such as Sweden or 
UK.  
 
By way of conclusion, we would like to make two remarks. First, the cost savings suggested by 
the price indices implicitly assumes that there would be no demand and price responses to the 
“import” of foreign price levels. This is of course a strong and fairly unreasonable assumption. It 
is plausible to assume that lower prices on some products would increase demand for these 
products. Moreover, lower prices on some products are also likely to generate price responses on 
competing products. Thus, the actual cost savings would depend on the demand and price 
responses generated by the lower price level enforced on a specific group of drugs.  
 
Second, the results based on the price indices do not say anything about the mechanisms that 
could be used to import the foreign price levels and their effects. One way of importing prices 
from abroad is through price cap regulation such as the system in place in Norway. This 
mechanism directly enforces lower prices on brand-names, but the demand and price responses 
on generics are less clear. Another way to implement lower prices is to reduce the reimbursement 
rates for the products under reference pricing (trinnpris). This is also likely to affect the pricing 
and demand for brand-names and generics, so that the actual cost savings might be different than 
the ones suggested by the price indices. Brekke et al. (2009, 2011) have studied the price and 
demand effects of using price cap or reference price regulation, which might give some guidance 
in estimating cost-savings when imposing lower price levels through regulation. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A: Prices and volumes in Scandinavia for substances under trinnpris regulation. 
   Norway Sweden Denmark 
Substance name Weight Brand / Generic 
Price
(AUP) Volume (doses)
Price
(AUP)
Volume 
(doses) 
Price 
(AUP) 
Volume
(doses)
ALENDRONIC ACID 0.0034 TOT 12.39 1 190 130 6.12 1 793 754 5.88 1 521 836
ALENDRONIC ACID  GEN 10.95 1 071 874 5.39 1 693 752 3.15 1 472 392
ALENDRONIC ACID  ORG 25.52 118 256 18.40 100 002 87.25 49 444
AMLODIPINE 0.0507 TOT 1.17 17 587 930 0.54 42 991 696 0.44 46 140 064
AMLODIPINE  GEN 1.02 15 361 940 0.48 40 705 814 0.37 45 557 236
AMLODIPINE  ORG 2.20 2 225 990 1.54 2 285 884 5.74 582 830
AMOXICILLIN 0.0075 TOT 3.24 2 608 321 3.97 3 496 677 3.87 3 576 761
AMOXICILLIN  GEN 2.79 1 692 830 3.96 3 481 443 3.81 2 335 366
AMOXICILLIN  ORG 4.08 915 491 5.99 15 234 3.99 1 241 395
ATENOLOL 0.0193 TOT 0.61 6 712 368 0.52 40 218 748 0.34 5 849 412
ATENOLOL  GEN 0.61 4 796 368 0.50 31 212 928 0.32 4 648 112
ATENOLOL  ORG 0.62 1 916 000 0.59 9 005 820 0.41 1 201 300
ATORVASTATIN 0.0404 TOT 4.25 14 035 214 11.48 12 621 866 11.64 7 483 968
ATORVASTATIN  GEN - - - - - -
ATORVASTATIN  ORG 4.25 14 035 214 11.48 12 621 866 11.64 7 483 968
CABERGOLINE 0.0002 TOT 10.81 75 460 18.59 97 662 37.98 68 868
CABERGOLINE  GEN - - 28.47 11 472 28.35 8 208
CABERGOLINE  ORG 10.81 75 460 17.27 86 190 39.28 60 660
CARVEDILOL 0.0144 TOT 1.12 4 994 622 0.80 4 735 920 0.76 8 698 680
CARVEDILOL  GEN 1.11 4 986 446 0.70 4 113 020 0.68 8 455 768
CARVEDILOL  ORG 7.32 8 176 1.41 622 900 3.56 242 912
CETIRIZINE 0.0832 TOT 0.86 28 883 720 0.68 10 765 440 1.76 2 953 550
CETIRIZINE  GEN 0.59 24 859 780 0.58 10 280 460 1.76 2 953 550
CETIRIZINE  ORG 2.48 4 023 940 2.59 484 980 - -
CIPROFLOXACIN 0.0046 TOT 4.20 1 605 675 3.43 3 406 988 2.22 4 728 389
CIPROFLOXACIN  GEN 4.80 1 038 550 3.33 2 947 352 2.14 4 720 465
CIPROFLOXACIN  ORG 3.09 567 125 4.09 459 636 53.67 7 924
CITALOPRAM 0.0151 TOT 1.67 5 237 710 0.60 39 526 588 1.08 27 305 414
CITALOPRAM  GEN 1.36 4 655 066 0.55 39 134 574 0.71 26 059 142
CITALOPRAM  ORG 4.15 582 644 5.87 392 014 8.77 1 246 272
CLARITHROMYCIN 0.0010 TOT 8.83 363 551 9.95 159 200 16.47 404 335
CLARITHROMYCIN  GEN 6.57 212 583 4.95 79 632 13.52 267 280
CLARITHROMYCIN  ORG 12.01 150 968 14.95 79 568 22.22 137 055
DICLOFENAC 0.0578 TOT 1.13 20 054 996 1.18 38 221 592 2.10 9 354 585
DICLOFENAC  GEN 1.18 7 078 850 1.10 32 612 220 1.92 8 342 775
DICLOFENAC  ORG 1.11 12 976 145 1.68 5 609 370 3.61 1 011 810
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DONEPEZIL 0.0036 TOT 11.85 1 238 498 25.68 2 574 914 31.25 1 375 878
DONEPEZIL  GEN 10.62 1 116 512 - - - -
DONEPEZIL  ORG 23.06 121 986 25.68 2 574 914 31.25 1 375 878
ENALAPRIL 0.0206 TOT 0.97 7 148 986 0.53 79 083 200 0.38 36 154 352
ENALAPRIL  GEN 0.93 5 359 310 0.51 77 403 182 0.37 11 956 020
ENALAPRIL  ORG 1.08 1 789 676 1.27 1 680 014 0.39 24 198 330
FELODIPINE 0.0075 TOT 1.68 2 589 774 0.78 43 586 808 0.86 5 885 102
FELODIPINE  GEN 1.50 2 003 440 0.71 38 702 220 0.74 5 652 502
FELODIPINE  ORG 2.29 586 334 1.29 4 884 586 3.80 232 600
FENTANYL 0.0013 TOT 36.00 453 385 46.89 1 232 258 63.63 1 010 927
FENTANYL  GEN 32.28 400 795 45.78 1 028 631 80.89 342 666
FENTANYL  ORG 64.37 52 590 52.52 203 627 54.77 668 261
FINASTERIDE 0.0054 TOT 3.34 1 864 702 1.71 7 581 312 1.81 1 878 268
FINASTERIDE  GEN 3.26 1 110 158 1.03 6 828 868 0.74 1 717 184
FINASTERIDE  ORG 3.47 754 544 7.85 752 444 13.24 161 084
FLUCONAZOLE 0.0006 TOT 25.65 196 662 15.20 757 582 6.87 1 044 403
FLUCONAZOLE  GEN 23.86 168 938 12.10 709 951 6.11 1 022 120
FLUCONAZOLE  ORG 36.57 27 724 61.46 47 631 41.61 22 283
FLUOXETINE 0.0043 TOT 3.27 1 505 970 1.03 7 948 212 2.14 2 894 210
FLUOXETINE  GEN 3.01 1 303 370 0.92 7 858 360 1.86 2 758 890
FLUOXETINE  ORG 4.92 202 600 10.08 89 852 7.85 135 320
FLUTICASONE 0.0522 TOT 1.39 18 122 536 2.00 10 161 090 2.12 11 042 552
FLUTICASONE  GEN 0.52 661 200 0.86 3 659 760 1.28 2 062 560
FLUTICASONE  ORG 1.42 17 461 336 2.64 6 501 330 2.32 8 979 992
GLIMEPIRIDE 0.0218 TOT 0.85 7 566 960 0.98 1 930 230 0.84 8 235 930
GLIMEPIRIDE  GEN 0.79 3 752 520 0.93 1 251 090 0.74 7 814 520
GLIMEPIRIDE  ORG 0.92 3 814 440 1.07 679 140 2.70 421 410
LANSOPRAZOLE 0.0160 TOT 2.28 5 552 756 5.85 4 224 798 1.55 15 071 194
LANSOPRAZOLE  GEN 2.11 5 436 206 3.32 782 702 1.55 15 071 194
LANSOPRAZOLE  ORG 10.17 116 550 6.43 3 442 096 - -
LISINOPRIL 0.0123 TOT 1.36 4 268 830 0.83 2 485 856 0.62 3 128 910
LISINOPRIL  GEN 1.32 3 506 730 0.72 2 108 400 0.62 3 128 910
LISINOPRIL  ORG 1.55 762 100 1.43 377 456 - -
LORATADINE 0.0251 TOT 1.06 8 708 780 0.82 7 511 030 2.17 2 722 200
LORATADINE  GEN 1.06 8 708 780 0.82 7 511 030 2.17 2 722 200
LORATADINE  ORG - - - - - -
LOSARTAN 0.0198 TOT 3.01 6 856 836 2.68 18 378 918 2.60 10 369 864
LOSARTAN  GEN 2.42 5 033 528 0.79 10 850 370 0.62 7 058 658
LOSARTAN  ORG 4.62 1 823 308 5.39 7 528 548 6.82 3 311 206
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MELOXICAM 0.0044 TOT 1.87 1 539 700 2.62 448 890 1.06 114 460
MELOXICAM  GEN 1.68 1 245 470 2.62 448 890 1.06 114 460
MELOXICAM  ORG 2.65 294 230 - - - -
METOPROLOL 0.1238 TOT 1.08 42 975 096 1.17 91 346 448 1.27 45 619 696
METOPROLOL  GEN 0.91 28 712 910 1.00 68 366 630 1.04 36 914 390
METOPROLOL  ORG 1.42 14 262 186 1.67 22 979 820 2.26 8 705 308
MIANSERIN 0.0136 TOT 0.97 4 712 270 1.63 2 905 030 1.38 3 474 450
MIANSERIN  GEN - - 1.63 2 844 060 1.36 3 322 680
MIANSERIN  ORG 0.97 4 712 270 1.71 60 970 1.64 151 770
MIRTAZAPINE 0.0102 TOT 3.48 3 543 095 1.52 15 761 326 1.21 9 172 966
MIRTAZAPINE  GEN - - 1.45 15 603 364 1.06 8 987 166
MIRTAZAPINE  ORG 3.48 3 543 095 8.55 157 962 8.16 185 800
MOXONIDINE 0.0030 TOT 2.03 1 050 350 2.74 465 214 1.18 1 452 232
MOXONIDINE  GEN 1.79 867 244 2.50 333 936 1.18 1 452 232
MOXONIDINE  ORG 3.19 183 106 3.36 131 278 - -
OLANZAPINE 0.0077 TOT 8.58 2 688 636 28.87 4 903 944 36.98 3 881 859
OLANZAPINE  GEN 5.27 1 937 936 - - - -
OLANZAPINE  ORG 17.10 750 700 28.87 4 903 944 36.98 3 881 859
OMEPRAZOLE 0.0158 TOT 3.45 5 479 560 0.97 66 132 080 1.03 11 964 708
OMEPRAZOLE  GEN 3.07 3 890 512 0.92 65 674 044 0.85 11 823 836
OMEPRAZOLE  ORG 4.35 1 589 048 7.63 458 038 16.46 140 872
ONDANSETRON 0.0011 TOT 31.38 392 045 22.12 680 193 24.21 601 709
ONDANSETRON  GEN 25.35 315 375 14.64 572 780 15.61 539 085
ONDANSETRON  ORG 56.17 76 670 62.02 107 413 98.17 62 624
OXYCODONE 0.0151 TOT 6.00 5 250 208 4.86 14 982 291 5.96 16 069 715
OXYCODONE  GEN 7.89 1 806 780 3.67 388 514 3.61 7 564 445
OXYCODONE  ORG 5.02 3 443 428 4.89 14 593 777 8.05 8 505 270
PANTOPRAZOLE 0.0259 TOT 2.14 8 985 116 2.82 3 122 375 1.57 10 922 910
PANTOPRAZOLE  GEN 2.17 171 240 0.73 2 630 402 1.45 10 752 612
PANTOPRAZOLE  ORG 2.14 8 813 876 14.02 491 973 9.45 170 298
PAROXETINE 0.0082 TOT 2.13 2 842 512 1.10 5 990 262 1.19 3 217 134
PAROXETINE  GEN 1.89 2 185 020 0.96 5 492 680 0.78 3 049 322
PAROXETINE  ORG 2.94 657 492 2.71 497 582 8.48 167 812
PIVMECILLINAM 0.0123 TOT 3.16 4 281 480 6.47 2 963 726 5.22 5 433 330
PIVMECILLINAM  GEN 2.66 2 677 670 - - 5.01 1 869 450
PIVMECILLINAM  ORG 4.01 1 603 810 6.47 2 963 726 5.33 3 563 880
PRAMIPEXOLE 0.0050 TOT 4.50 1 719 800 6.29 7 556 510 11.89 3 312 800
PRAMIPEXOLE  GEN 3.36 1 255 310 - - - -
PRAMIPEXOLE  ORG 7.57 464 490 6.29 7 556 510 11.89 3 312 800
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PRAVASTATIN 0.0086 TOT 2.96 3 016 222 1.09 3 100 090 2.52 1 281 290
PRAVASTATIN  GEN 2.18 2 523 870 0.96 3 046 680 2.52 1 281 290
PRAVASTATIN  ORG 7.01 492 352 8.13 53 410 - -
QUETIAPINE 0.0110 TOT 4.25 3 850 830 13.44 5 111 640 14.54 9 269 750
QUETIAPINE  GEN 3.26 3 359 300 - - - -
QUETIAPINE  ORG 11.02 491 530 13.44 5 111 640 14.54 9 269 750
RAMIPRIL 0.0309 TOT 0.97 10 720 744 0.69 26 845 610 0.74 20 663 672
RAMIPRIL  GEN 0.93 6 452 376 0.62 25 100 506 0.68 20 284 398
RAMIPRIL  ORG 1.04 4 268 368 1.66 1 745 104 3.77 379 274
RANITIDINE 0.0142 TOT 1.30 4 919 645 1.25 3 827 335 14.23 15 140
RANITIDINE  GEN 1.07 2 268 990 0.90 2 763 600 - -
RANITIDINE  ORG 1.50 2 650 655 2.15 1 063 735 14.23 15 140
RISPERIDONE 0.0047 TOT 12.53 1 631 891 7.12 6 831 896 20.85 3 419 095
RISPERIDONE  GEN 2.79 1 430 000 0.92 5 370 390 1.54 3 228 026
RISPERIDONE  ORG 81.54 201 891 42.76 997 350 347.20 191 069
RIVASTIGMINE 0.0022 TOT 15.14 754 658 16.67 1 545 378 24.46 826 132
RIVASTIGMINE  GEN - - - - - -
RIVASTIGMINE  ORG 15.14 754 658 16.67 1 545 378 24.46 826 132
ROPINIROLE 0.0024 TOT 8.70 832 080 10.29 981 310 17.05 1 013 381
ROPINIROLE  GEN 3.29 196 224 4.17 15 666 4.65 282 282
ROPINIROLE  ORG 10.36 635 856 10.38 965 644 21.83 731 099
SERTRALINE 0.0124 TOT 2.24 4 300 505 0.99 23 816 480 1.06 6 500 262
SERTRALINE  GEN 2.09 1 200 540 0.76 21 434 162 0.70 6 268 548
SERTRALINE  ORG 2.30 3 099 965 3.12 2 382 318 10.85 231 714
SIBUTRAMINE 0.0005 TOT 5.95 182 382 10.04 526 624 11.73 56 364
SIBUTRAMINE  GEN 4.84 150 630 - - - -
SIBUTRAMINE  ORG 11.19 31 752 10.04 526 624 11.73 56 364
SIMVASTATIN 0.1456 TOT 1.70 50 556 856 0.53 109 361 528 0.41 69 641 800
SIMVASTATIN  GEN 1.60 47 770 424 0.52 108 849 870 0.39 69 531 158
SIMVASTATIN  ORG 3.41 2 786 434 3.46 511 658 10.09 110 642
SUMATRIPTAN 0.0023 TOT 37.77 795 784 23.55 1 619 668 22.79 882 274
SUMATRIPTAN  GEN 13.46 431 850 6.23 1 246 468 7.05 751 126
SUMATRIPTAN  ORG 66.61 363 934 81.40 373 200 112.90 131 148
TAMSULOSIN 0.0125 TOT 2.76 4 324 650 - - 1.21 4 282 020
TAMSULOSIN  GEN 2.54 2 418 000 - - 0.92 4 107 450
TAMSULOSIN  ORG 3.03 1 906 650 - - 7.81 174 570
TERBINAFINE 0.0034 TOT 5.64 1 187 050 2.62 1 150 656 2.65 1 899 394
TERBINAFINE  GEN 5.62 1 027 674 1.65 942 480 2.62 1 897 532
TERBINAFINE  ORG 5.77 159 376 7.03 208 176 29.41  1 862
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VENLAFAXINE 0.0149 TOT 2.55 5 164 709 1.48 11 964 980 1.63 6 548 433
VENLAFAXINE  GEN 2.20 4 631 165 1.33 11 782 663 1.26 6 334 587
VENLAFAXINE  ORG 5.64 533 544 11.28 182 317 12.45 213 846
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